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ABSTRACT 
 
Hospitals and physicians in the United States increasingly work together under common 
ownership. Over the past decade, physicians have gravitated toward employment at hospital-
owned facilities and hospitals have acquired large numbers of physician practices; collectively, 
these changes have become known as “vertical integration” among these providers. The rapid 
growth in vertical integration raises questions about the causes and effects of this fundamental 
realignment in the American health care delivery system. In this dissertation, I explore three 
economic issues connected to the causes and consequences of this realignment. 
In the first chapter of this dissertation, I investigate vertical integration from a health care 
payment policy lens. I explore whether Medicare reimbursement policy created incentives that 
have driven vertical integration. I measure the size of the differences in Medicare reimbursement 
at integrated and non-integrated sites for a nationally representative sample of physicians. I then 
evaluate whether these reimbursement differences stimulated vertical integration activity. I find 
that despite large financial incentives, these payment differentials exerted little influence on 
vertical integration, implying only a small role for Medicare payment policy in accelerating or 
decelerating vertical integration. 
In the second chapter, I examine vertical integration from a labor economics lens. Since changes 
in productivity incentives often accompany changes in employment setting, I examine the 
clinical output of primary care physicians who join hospital systems, i.e., the productivity of 
physicians who become vertically integrated. I find that when physicians move from a non-
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integrated practice to an integrated practice, they reduce their clinical output by 10 to 20 percent. 
They see fewer patients, bill fewer services, and generate less professional revenue. These 
sizable effects imply that vertical integration could reduce physician workloads, but with fewer 
primary care appointments available, integration may also threaten patient access to essential 
care. 
In the third chapter, I explore vertical integration with an eye toward clinical documentation and 
alternative payment models. Hospitals and physicians might integrate to prepare for, or to 
perform better in, alternative payment models that use patients’ documented clinical severity as 
the cornerstone of risk-adjusted payment. These models create large incentives for provider 
systems to document patient illness as thoroughly as possible. Hospitals may extend their 
documentation resources to their integrated physician practices. To test whether vertical 
integration affects documented patient illness, I examine a sample of several million patients 
with varying exposure to vertically integrated physicians. Using several statistical approaches, I 
estimate that patient exposure to vertically integrated physicians is associated with annual 
increases in reported patient illness of 10-24 percent. These large effects imply that the 
increasing prevalence of vertically integrated systems may raise costs to Medicare, Medicaid, 
and commercial health insurers. 
The continued rise in health care spending constitutes one of the most pressing public policy 
problems in the United States. Understanding the complex role of vertical integration in this 
problem is one step toward greater affordability. This dissertation adds three specific insights to 
increase that understanding. 
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Chapter 1. Site-Based Payments and Hospital-Physician Vertical Integration 
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Chapter 1 Abstract 
 
Importance: Vertical integration of hospitals and physicians has accelerated in the last decade, 
causing increases in prices and spending. One commonly cited reason for this acceleration is 
Medicare’s site-based payment policy that pays providers more for the same services if 
performed in a hospital-owned office. 
Objective: To determine the relationship between Medicare’s site-based outpatient billing policy 
and hospital-physician integration. 
Design: Retrospective, longitudinal study of physicians from all 50 U.S. States who served 
Medicare patients between 2010-2015 (n=1,737,678 physician-year observations). For each 
physician-year, we calculated the disparity between Medicare reimbursement under hospital 
ownership and under physician ownership. Using regression analysis, we estimated the 
relationship between these payment differences and hospital-physician integration, adjusting for 
region, market concentration, and physician fixed effects. 
Setting: The study included physicians who billed Medicare between January 1, 2010 and 
December 31, 2015 (n=1,737,678 physician-year observations). 
Participants: Integrated and non-integrated physicians were selected. Eligible medical specialties 
included primary care, diagnostic radiology, obstetrics and gynecology, cardiology, surgery, 
psychiatry, gastroenterology, neurology, dermatology, urology, and otolaryngology. Data were 
analyzed from November 1, 2018 through February 28, 2020.  
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Exposure: Difference in Medicare reimbursement between hospital-owned and physician-owned 
settings, measured using each physician’s claims and comparing service-level reimbursements in 
the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule and the Medicare Outpatient Prospective Payment System. 
Main Outcomes and Measures: Physician integration with a hospital, measured as integrated if a 
physician billed outpatient services under a hospital outpatient place of service, or if a 
physician’s employer name corresponded to a hospital system. 
Results: 50,278 physicians were integrated in 2010 (17.9 percent), while 61,054 physicians were 
integrated in 2015 (20.5 percent). Medicare reimbursement for physician services would have 
been an average of 85 percent higher, or approximately $77,000 higher per year, if a physician 
integrated instead of remaining independent. There was considerable variation across specialties: 
cardiologists faced a 59 percent reimbursement increase under integration, primary care 
physicians 72 percent, and urologists 244 percent. Yet there was a relatively weak relationship 
between outpatient payment differentials and integration. An increase in this outpatient payment 
differential equivalent to moving from the 25th to 75th percentile was associated with only a 0.17 
percentage point increase in the probability of integrating with a hospital (95% CI: 0.07 to 0.28, 
p < .01). The marginal effect of the payment differential was larger among primary care 
physicians, where a 25th to 75th percentile increase was associated with a 0.45 percentage point 
increase in the probability of integrating (95% CI: 0.35 to 0.55, p < .001). By contrast, the 
relationship between the payment differential and integration was negative among cardiologists, 
with a 1.55 percentage point decrease in the probability of integrating (95% CI: -1.82 to -1.28, p 
< .001). Across all specialties, the marginal effect of the payment differential was larger at higher 
levels of the differential, most notably among primary care physicians. Higher hospital market 
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concentration and being in a rural area were also associated with greater likelihood of 
integration. 
Conclusions and Relevance: While Medicare’s site-based outpatient payment policy may play a 
smaller role in the increase of hospital-physician vertical integration than previously thought, it 
may influence hospital-physician integration decisions on the margin among physicians who face 
especially high payment differentials, particularly in primary care.  
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Introduction 
 
Over the last decade, hospitals continued to acquire physician practices in large numbers.1–3 As 
of 2018, hospitals owned 31.2 percent of physician practices, up from 13.6 percent in 2012.2 
Site-based reimbursement, in which outpatient care can be billed at a higher rate if the place of 
service is owned by a hospital, is one potential driver of hospital-physician vertical integration 
(hereafter, “integration”).4,5 In 2011, an office visit with a new patient could be billed for $198 in 
a doctor’s office. The same visit could be billed for $331 if the office were designated a hospital 
outpatient department (HOPD), thereby generating a facility fee in addition to the physician fee.6 
The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) noted that the HOPD-office payment 
difference “creates a financial incentive for hospitals to purchase freestanding physicians’ offices 
and convert them to [outpatient departments] without changing their location or patient mix.”7 
These observations, and concern about unnecessary increases in spending, have led to calls for 
“site-neutral payments,” or equal payment for certain outpatient procedures, regardless of 
practice site. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) introduced site-neutral 
rulemaking that took effect on January 1, 2019, decreasing off-campus HOPD reimbursement to 
office levels for certain patient visits. Although litigation against the rule is ongoing, CMS has 
pursued its site-neutral policies in 2020.8 
Despite this move towards site-neutral payments, little is known about the extent to which site-
based payment influences integration. While hospitals can increase reimbursement from 
physician services through integration, site-based payment may not be a major factor in 
integration decisions. Instead, hospitals may be driven more by the desire to gain leverage in 
price negotiations with commercial payers9 and influence physician referral behavior and 
hospital choice.10,11 Integration could also be driven by a shared desire across hospitals and 
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physicians to enhance care coordination, facilitate health information exchange, or adapt to new 
payment models.4 
In this paper, we examined the relationship between site-based Medicare payment differences 
and integration. Using 2010-2015 Medicare data, we calculated the reimbursement value of each 
physician’s services if performed in an HOPD and compared it to the value if performed in an 
office. We then assessed whether hospital outpatient payment differentials were associated with 
greater likelihood of integration, hypothesizing that larger payment differentials would lead to 
greater integration.  
Methods 
 
We used Medicare 20 percent sample files of Part B claims; Medicare Provider Analysis and 
Review files (MEDPAR); Medicare Outpatient Prospective Payment System (OPPS) files; 
Medicare Physician Fee Schedule (PFS) files; Medicare Data on Provider Practice and Specialty 
(MD-PPAS); and the American Medical Association (AMA) Physician Masterfile. All datasets 
included years 2010-2015. MEDPAR contains patient claims for inpatient encounters. The 
Medicare Part B claims contain the claims history for a 20% sample of Medicare beneficiaries, 
described in detail elsewhere.12 The Medicare OPPS and PFS files contain information required 
to calculate prices for services in the office and HOPD settings. MD-PPAS contains tax 
identifiers and legal names for each physician’s primary place of practice. The AMA Masterfile 
is a comprehensive database of nearly all U.S. physicians and lists demographic and professional 
characteristics associated with each physician. 
The claims files allowed us to characterize several aspects of a physician’s practice: whether a 
physician was integrated with a hospital; the market concentration of hospitals and physicians; 
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and the number of procedures performed and the associated Medicare revenue. We used the Part 
B claims with the Medicare OPPS and PFS files to calculate the value of each physician’s 
services if billed from an office and if billed from an HOPD.  
Our study population included physicians in the United States who billed Medicare between 
2010 and 2015. We limited our analysis to physicians with specialty codes of primary care, 
diagnostic radiology, OB/GYN, cardiology, surgery, psychiatry, gastroenterology, neurology, 
dermatology, urology, and otolaryngology. We excluded oncology because of the unique role of 
the 340B drug program in hospital-physician relations in this specialty.13–15 We also required 
each physician to have over 10 recorded line items in Medicare claims and have a matching 
record from the AMA Masterfile. We excluded a small number of physicians with invalid 
National Provider Identifiers. The resulting file was an unbalanced panel of physicians 
(n=1,737,678 physician-years) who met these criteria in all six years of the study period (see 
Appendix 1.1 for sample flow diagram).  
Our outcome was physician integration with a hospital. We defined integration using a strategy 
developed by Neprash and colleagues which uses place of service codes found in Medicare 
claims.4 We supplemented this definition by identifying physicians whose legal names in MD-
PPAS data were likely to correspond to hospital employment (Appendix 1.8).  
Our key exposure variable was a measure of the financial incentive to bill under an HOPD place 
of service, which we call the “HOPD ratio.” To calculate the magnitude of this financial 
incentive, we examined the full bundle of services for which a physician billed Medicare each 
year, using the Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System (HCPCS) codes found on each 
claim. Medicare specifies reimbursement levels for each HCPCS code and each place of service. 
We compared the dollar amount of revenue if a physician performed all their services under an 
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office code to the revenue if performed under an HOPD code. For every physician in each year, 
we measured the HOPD ratio as the revenue available if they billed their bundle of services from 
an HOPD divided by the revenue available if they billed from an office. Each physician thus had 
their own HOPD ratio, with variation in this ratio across physicians driven by differences in the 
bundle of services that each physician delivered to their patients. This measure exhibits variation 
across specialty (since physicians of different specialties perform different procedures, each of 
which is associated with different HOPD-office payment disparities) as well as within specialty 
(since each physician within a specialty performs a slightly different bundle of procedures 
depending on their patients’ needs). More detail about our approach can be found in Appendix 
1.8. 
We were interested in understanding the relationship between the HOPD ratio and integration 
among physicians. We hypothesized that physicians with large potential gains from billing as an 
HOPD instead of an office, i.e., those with large HOPD ratios, would be more likely to be 
acquired by the end of the study period. To test this, we estimated linear probability models with 
physician fixed effects. We also calculated and controlled for market competitiveness of 
hospitals and physicians, since the degree of market competition influences the incentive to 
integrate.9 We clustered standard errors at the physician level. In our preferred specification, we 
include the ratio, its squared term, and its cubic term to account for non-linearity in the effect. 
We report the marginal effects of the ratio on the probability to integrate. We also performed 
stratified analysis, estimating this model within samples of primary care physicians, surgeons, 
cardiologists, and other specialties. 
We conducted several sensitivity analyses to examine the robustness of our results to alternative 
specifications (Appendix 1.3 and Appendix 1.4). We tested a sample that included oncologists. 
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We tested Logit models and linear probability models (with and without physician fixed effects). 
We implemented our independent variable with squares and cubic terms, with lags, and 
expressed in dollars. These analyses did not change our conclusions. 
Our study has several limitations. First, since we use Medicare prices in our analysis, we can 
only make inferences on the effect of Medicare reimbursement rates on integration. While 
commercial rates are also important to physicians, many commercial payers negotiate their 
prices using Medicare rates as a benchmark.16 This suggests that although commercial rates may 
be higher, the HOPD ratio is likely to remain comparable. Second, we use a claims-based 
measure of integration supplemented by a keyword search of physicians’ employer names. If 
acquired practices do not promptly update their place of service in their Medicare claims, then a 
claims-based approach may introduce measurement error into our dependent variable and bias 
our findings toward a null result. The advantage of a claims-based measure is that it is easily 
understood, can be reliably reproduced using a commonly available data source, and allows us to 
generate a large, nationally representative physician sample. Moreover, it is the best fit with our 
research question, which centers on the ability of providers to receive larger payments using a 
different place of service on Medicare claims. If providers do not update their place of service 
after integration, we would not measure their integration status correctly – however, neither 
would the provider be able to receive higher reimbursement, implying that taking advantage of 
the payment differential was not the primary incentive. The levels and trends of integration that 
we calculate are also broadly consistent – overall and across specialties – with research using 
alternative measures (see Appendix 1.2). We also believe our keyword search supplement helps 
to mitigate measurement error. Third, we focus on only a subset of physician specialties and 
select years. While our findings may not generalize to every specialty, our subset contains the 
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most common physician types and allows for a parsimonious analysis. Further, our analysis 
captures a key time period, as the years between 2010 and 2015 reportedly exhibited the sharpest 
increase in integration.17 Fourth, a potential critique of this analysis is that the payment changes 
are not sufficiently exogenous, i.e., that the service-level payment updates are correlated to the 
underlying costs of performing those services, thereby leaving profitability (and the incentive to 
integrate) unchanged, biasing our results toward the null. We propose, however, that costs and 
reimbursement updates are weakly correlated. Medicare reimbursement updates derive from 
numerous factors, of which provider costs are only one; other factors include beneficiary access 
to care, quality of care, providers’ access to capital, and Medicare payments (p. 31).7 During our 
study timeframe, MedPAC further stated “Medicare payment policy should not be designed 
simply to accommodate whatever level of cost growth a sector demonstrates… The Commission 
does not start with any presumption that an update is needed or that any increase in costs should 
be automatically offset by the update” (p. 37).7 Given the array of budgetary factors taken into 
account for payment updates, we think that reimbursement updates are likely to be weakly 
correlated to underlying costs. 
Results 
 
We identified a total of 1,737,678 physician-years who met inclusion criteria between 2010 and 
2015 (Table 1.1). Primary care physicians comprised about 46 percent of our sample. Integration 
increased between 2010 and 2015 from 17.9 percent of the sample to 20.5 percent. The average 
HOPD ratio in 2010 was 1.85. This indicates that for the average physician, the revenue they 
would have generated for their bundle of services if performed in an HOPD would have been 
185 percent the size of revenue they would have generated for the same services if performed in 
an office. Given that average office revenue in 2010 was approximately $91,000, this implies 
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that integrating with a hospital would have increased total reimbursement by approximately 
$77,000. The HOPD ratio increased to an average of 1.92 in 2015. The average hospital referral 
region (HRR) Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) for hospitals was over 1,700 and for physician 
specialties was over 300.  
The levels of integration differed markedly by specialty, with diagnostic radiologists having the 
highest rates of integration (59 percent), dermatologists the lowest (6 percent), and primary care 
physicians in the middle (22 percent) (Figure 1.1). For urology, surgical specialties, and 
gastroenterology, the 2011 HOPD ratio exceeded 2.00. There was little evidence of a cross-
sectional relationship between the HOPD ratio and integration. Physicians in all specialties faced 
an incentive to integrate, with about a quarter of physicians having a ratio of 2.00 or more, 
indicating that reimbursement for their services would have been double in a hospital-owned 
outpatient department compared to equivalent services delivered in an office (Appendix 1.5). 
Diagnostic radiologists were the most integrated specialty in our sample (59 percent). These 
physicians provide a service to other doctors or hospitals and do not take care of patients 
directly. Most radiology tests occur in the hospital inpatient or outpatient setting as opposed to 
the office, corresponding to the high levels of hospital employment we observed in our data. 
Estimates from the adjusted models showed that the HOPD ratio was significantly associated 
with integration, though the magnitude of the effect was generally small and varied by specialty 
(Figure 1.2). In the full sample, the average effect of a 1-unit increase in the HOPD ratio 
(approximately equal to moving from the 5th percentile to the 90th percentile of the HOPD ratio) 
was associated with a 0.47 percentage point increase in the probability of integrating with a 
hospital.  
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Our estimates showed heterogeneous effects of the HOPD ratio over the size of the ratio. At the 
lowest decile of the HOPD ratio, the effect in the full sample was negative: marginal increases in 
the ratio decreased the probability of integration with a hospital (marginal effect [ME] = -0.02). 
The effect grew steadily more positive as the size of the ratio increased: by the 50th percentile, 
we observed a small positive relationship between the ratio and integration (ME = 0.005). At the 
80th and 90th percentiles, the effect of an increase in the HOPD ratio was about 3 percentage 
points (ME=0.03) (Figure 1.2).  
The effect of the HOPD ratio varied substantially by specialty. We observed, however, a similar 
pattern across all specialties we examined, in that the effect was smallest at low levels of the 
ratio, and largest at high levels of the ratio. In primary care, this curve was sharp: while the ratio 
had a small negative effect among those in the lowest decile, the marginal effect among the 
second decile was a positive 1 percentage point, and at the 90th percentile, the effect was nearly 
10 percentage points. In cardiology, the marginal effects grew from the lowest decile to the 
highest, but at all levels, the marginal effects were negative, until the 80th and 90th percentiles, at 
which point the effect was not statistically different from zero. Among surgeons, the marginal 
effects were, between the 10th and 40th percentiles, close to zero, and positive but relatively small 
from the 50th through 90th percentiles (between 1 and 3 percentage points). Among the remaining 
physician specialties, the effects in the lower half of the HOPD ratio distribution were slightly 
negative or non-significant, and in the upper half of the distribution, slightly positive or non-
significant. 
We also found that high levels of hospital market concentration as well as rural geography was 
associated with a higher probability of a physician being integrated (Appendix 1.3, column 2). 
To identify these effects, we estimated a linear probability model in which we dropped physician 
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fixed effects, but included physician age, medical specialty, region, rural status, and market 
concentration of hospitals and physicians. A 10 percent increase in the HRR-level hospital HHI 
was associated with a 2.2 percentage point increase in the probability of integrating with a 
hospital. Physician market concentration was associated with a lower probability of integrating. 
Rural status was associated with an 8 percentage point greater probability of integrating with a 
hospital. Sensitivity analyses confirmed the robustness of our results to alternative specifications 
(Appendix 1.3 and Appendix 1.4). 
Discussion 
 
In this national study of the relationship between Medicare’s outpatient payment differentials and 
hospital-physician integration, we report three main findings. First, HOPD ratios were high and 
varied considerably across specialties. Second, HOPD ratios were associated with greater 
integration among physicians facing the largest site-based payment disparities. Third, there was 
considerable heterogeneity in the association between HOPD ratios and integration across 
specialties, with primary care physicians exhibiting much more responsiveness than other 
specialties. 
A number of recent studies have shown an increase in integration in the past decade.2,18 Nikpay 
and colleagues also demonstrated differences in integration trends by specialty, finding that 
oncology and cardiology accelerated faster than other specialties.17 A recent investigation 
examined the roles of Medicare’s chemotherapy drug payment policy and 340B drug discount 
program in driving hospital-physician integration among oncology practices. The investigators 
found little evidence that these policies caused vertical integration.14  
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Our results add nuance to two published studies that explore site-based payments and integration. 
Song and colleagues found that after payment changes in 2010 that favored the HOPD setting, 
growth in the share of services performed in the HOPD setting grew by 2.7-5.9 percentage points 
for the three cardiology imaging services they selected.19 In our study, we add to this approach 
by allowing thousands of possible outpatient physician services, using payment updates across a 
six-year period, and controlling for physician-specific effects. In contrast with Song and 
colleagues, among cardiologists, we find that, on average, moving from the 25th percentile of the 
HOPD ratio to the 75th percentile decreases the probability of a cardiologist integrating with a 
hospital by about 1.5 percentage points (Appendix A7). Practices with high imaging volumes, of 
the sort studied by Song and colleagues, may have particularly high payment differentials. 
Hospitals might disproportionately prefer to integrate with practices with high imaging volumes, 
which would help explain these findings. Consistent with this possibility, our effect becomes less 
negative among cardiologists at higher levels of the ratio, even becoming slightly positive at the 
90th percentile. 
Second, Dranove and Ody examine a broader swathe of the physician population and determine 
that changes to Medicare prices in 2010 accounted for 20 percent of the increase in hospital 
employment.5 Our study differs in several key ways. Notably, our exposure is different. We use 
annual payment updates from 2010-2015 instead of a single-year payment shock. We also rely 
on Medicare claims data while Dranove and Ody proxy for exposure to Medicare price changes 
using private claims data. They also exclude the most common procedures in calculating relative 
prices (which would include, for example, office visits), although the authors indicate that this 
exclusion did not substantively affect their results. Their analyses, which find a positive 
relationship, are restricted to metro areas; our results include rural areas, in which we find that 
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the average effect of the HOPD ratio is weaker. Lastly, their measure of integration relies on 
private claims data, ours on Medicare data. Our samples may include slightly different sets of 
physicians. While we would expect high correspondence between integration measures from 
their data and ours, the degree of correspondence is unknown. Further work to compare the 
correlation between different ways of measuring integration is essential in this topic. 
The present study broadens our understanding of payment policy and vertical integration in 
several key ways. It is the first to describe the size of the financial incentive to integrate by 
quantifying the magnitude of the HOPD-office payment differential for each physician’s actual 
bundle of Medicare services each year, eschewing guesswork about composition of services, and 
we find that the financial incentive is enormous – over $77,000 per year for the average 
physician. We also add to the literature with detailed estimates of specialty-specific differences 
in integration patterns, as well as specialty-specific differences in the relationship between 
integration and Medicare’s site-based billing policies; we find that it is difficult to characterize 
the relationship for physicians as a uniform group, since specialty appears to exert a strong 
influence on this relationship. Finally, we show that outpatient reimbursement policy may be less 
responsible for driving hospital-physician vertical integration than previously thought. Previous 
studies of this topic have alluded to a potential role for relative outpatient prices in integration.1,20 
Our evidence suggests this role is relatively small. The effect of the HOPD ratio may have been 
more important among primary care physicians (exhibiting a positive relationship) and 
cardiologists (exhibiting a negative relationship) than other specialties during our study period. 
Concentrated hospital markets also appear to increase the likelihood that a physician integrates 
with a hospital. We also observed that rural providers were more likely to integrate than their 
urban counterparts. Incentives to integrate could differ across rural and urban areas for several 
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reasons: physician labor markets are less competitive in rural areas than urban; rural critical 
access hospitals (CAHs) are exempt from certain value-based reforms like Medicare’s Hospital 
Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP); and rural hospitals are subject to different quality 
improvement programs and looser staffing restrictions.21 In the present study we were unable to 
test which factors drive the observed urban-rural difference, though we think this is an important 
area of further research.  
The regulation of site-based payments has seen changes in recent years. In 2015, Congress 
passed the Bipartisan Budget Act, which grandfathered in HOPD payment rates to existing 
offices that billed as off-campus HOPDs on or before November 1, 2015. The 21st Century Cures 
Act of 2016 extended these exceptions to offices that were mid-transition at that time. However, 
recent rulemaking activity from CMS has begun to impose certain site-neutral payments on off-
campus HOPDs – even among grandfathered HOPDs – beginning with clinic visits. The legality 
of this payment rule is subject to a lawsuit by the American Hospital Association, but as of 
January 1, 2019, clinic visits began being paid the same reimbursement as an office. CMS 
projected that these changes would save the Medicare program $380 million in 2019 and $760 
million in 2020.22  
Facility fees appear to distort incentives and cause care to be delivered in unnecessarily 
expensive settings.23 MedPAC has pointed out that facility fees are “an inefficient way to reward 
hospitals for improving care (such as reducing readmissions) because it does not distinguish 
between hospitals that improve care and reduce spending and those that do not.”24 Site-neutral 
payments will likely reduce costs for beneficiaries receiving outpatient care. The long-term 
effects of expanding site-neutral payments are less clear. Facility payments exist, in principle, to 
ensure the sustainability of facilities, like HOPDs, that carry higher overhead costs.24 In the 
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extreme case, canceling all facility payments and instead reimbursing all outpatient settings 
under PFS rates (in other words, implementing total site-neutral payments) might cause some 
facilities to close their doors or reduce their services. This would, as a byproduct, also reduce 
competition, which would be counterproductive to cost containment and would create barriers to 
patient care. Further, HOPDs might add value to care delivery in their communities, such as 
efforts to improve care coordination, in which case facility payments might promote these 
activities.24  
Site-specific payments, however useful they may be on their own merits, seem to exert only a 
modest influence on decisions about hospital acquisitions of physician practices. Disparities in 
payment rates between HOPDs and offices existed for many years without an acceleration in 
integration, which highlights the inadequacy of site-specific reimbursement as the main 
explanation for the recent increase in integration. 
The bargaining hypothesis, i.e., that providers vertically integrate to gain a leg up in negotiations 
with commercial payers, is another hypothesis that may underlie the trend toward vertical 
integration. Many recent studies have confirmed that vertical integration is associated with rising 
commercial prices.4,25,26 Alternatively, physicians today may find independent practices less 
commercially viable than in the past due to the costs of regulatory compliance, alternative 
payment models, or electronic health records.27,28 Physician work preferences could be another 
important factor; some have suggested that generational differences in preference for economic 
security or work life balance may push more physicians to work for hospitals, and evidence from 
staff surveys suggests that burnout is lower among physicians working for hospitals.18,29  
Given that integration appears to threaten the affordability of care with minimal gains in 
quality10,30–36, it is worth further evaluating what the underlying causes of integration are and 
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what can be done to address them. Antitrust policy is unlikely to be a reliable remedy: many 
office acquisitions are not large enough to trigger antitrust scrutiny, and physicians who are 
directly hired to work at a hospital facility are not part of acquisitions at all.37,38 Many provider 
markets are already well beyond the “highly concentrated” thresholds set by antitrust agencies.39 
Further work should explore not only the implications of vertical integration for cost and access, 
but also the underlying strategic motivations of providers and whether these motivations are 
amenable to policy intervention. Site-neutral payments can help to reduce the costly effects of 
the movement toward vertical integration, but, over our study period, would have likely done 
little to slow it down. 
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Chapter 1 Exhibits 
 
Table 1.1. Characteristics of physicians in the study sample 
 
2010 2015 
N  
 
Total 280,703 297,472 
Primary Care 135,069 
(48.1%) 
132,634  
(44.6%) 
 Non- Primary Care 145,634 
(51.9%) 
164,838 
(55.4%) 
   
Physician Demographics   
Integrated 
N 
% 
  
    Yes 50,278 
(17.9%) 
61,054 
(20.5%) 
    No 230,425 
(82.1%) 
236,418 
(79.5%) 
HOPD Ratio mean (SD) 1.85 (0.36) 1.92 (0.42) 
Office revenue mean (SD) 90,929 (165,493) 92,413 (183,795) 
Age mean  
(SD) 
50 (10) 52 (11) 
Female 71,772 (25.6%) 86,921 (29.2%) 
Census Region   
Midwest 23% 23% 
Northeast 22% 22% 
South 34% 34% 
West 21% 21% 
   
Market characteristics   
Average hospital HHI 
(HRR level)  
1,756 1,852 
Average physician HHI 
(HRR level) 
326 336 
Note: Average hospital and physician HHIs are weighted by the number of physicians in the 
sample practicing in each of the relevant geographies.  
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Figure 1.1. Variation in integration and the hospital outpatient department ratio by specialty 
 
Note: Exhibit includes data from 1,539,358 physician-years between 2010 and 2015.  
Note: OBGYN – Obstetrics and Gynecology 
Note: Larger circles denote a greater number of physicians. 
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Figure 1.2. Marginal Effects of HOPD Ratio on the Probability of Integrating with a Hospital 
 
 
Note: HOPD – Hospital Outpatient Department 
Marginal effects and 95% confidence interval bars shown for a model with physician fixed 
effects and controls for hospital and physician Herfindal-Hirschman Indices. Points are the 
deciles of the HOPD ratio within each specialty. Sample sizes for each of the models above 
were: 1,737,678 (full sample), 798,414 (primary care), 312,228 (surgery), 118,409 (cardiology), 
and 508,627 (other specialties). Other specialties include dermatology, diagnostic radiology, 
gastroenterology, neurology, obstetrics and gynecology, psychiatry, and urology. 
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Chapter 1 Appendix 
 
Appendix 1.1. Sample Flow Diagram 
 Starting sample size 
Provider NPI-years 2010-2015  3,973,934 
  
  
Inclusion criteria Resulting N 
NPI appears in both Medicare 
and AMA files 3,021,343 
NPI valid length and format 3,021,337 
Specialties of interest 2,346,034 
Exclude oncology 2,255,267 
Exclude those with 10 or fewer 
line items 2,207,055 
Nonmissing key variables 
(HOPD ratio, HHI) 1,814,906 
Keep physicians aged 21-84 1,809,608 
Geographic information 
nonmissing 1,737,678 
Final sample size 1,737,678 
Note: AMA – American Medical Association; HHI – Herfindal-Hirschman Index; HOPD – 
Hospital Outpatient Department; NPI – National Provider Identifier 
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Appendix 1.2. Comparing Integration Estimates 
  
2008, 
Neprash 
2010, 
Post 
2011, 
Nikpay 
2012, 
Neprash 
2015, 
Nikpay 
2015, 
Post 
Primary care 18 22 13-20 24 22-37 23 
Hematology-Oncology 
or Oncology 24  25 32 50 
 
Diagnostic radiology 45 57   45   60 
Neurology 18 17 16 22 30 24 
Cardiology 27 12 15 28 40 22 
Orthopedic surgery 8   10 10 30   
Gastroenterology 11 12 10 14 25 17 
Otolaryngology 8 9 7  11 18 14 
Urology 9 9 10 12 22 14 
Ophthalmology 8   4 9 5   
Dermatology 7 6 5 8 7 7 
Pediatric     11-40   18-55   
General surgery   15 15   40 20 
Pulmonology     15   38   
Psychiatry   25 7   12 19 
Rheumatology     14   28   
Colorectal surgery     9   33   
Women’s Health   12 13   25 16 
Sources: 4,17  
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Appendix 1.3. Comparing linear probability models with and without fixed effects and logit 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES LPM FE 
(Preferred) 
LPM Logit 
    
Integrated    
    
HOPD Ratio -0.257*** -0.754*** 0.0247*** 
 (0) (0) (0) 
HOPD Ratio squared 0.123*** 0.368***  
 (0) (0)  
HOPD Ratio cubed -0.0180*** -0.0540***  
 (0) (0)  
year = 2011 0.00586*** 0.000174 0.000576 
 (0) (0.722) (0.232) 
year = 2012 0.0135*** 0.0139*** 0.0137*** 
 (0) (0) (0) 
year = 2013 0.0208*** 0.0220*** 0.0213*** 
 (0) (0) (0) 
year = 2014 0.0245*** 0.0215*** 0.0215*** 
 (0) (0) (0) 
year = 2015 0.0286*** 0.0257*** 0.0257*** 
 (0) (0) (0) 
Hospital HHI (ln) 0.0186*** 0.0219*** 0.0206*** 
 (0) (0) (0) 
Specialty HHI (ln) -0.00190* -0.00575*** -0.00482*** 
 (0.0649) (0) (0) 
Number of claims (ln) -0.0282*** -0.0779*** -0.0668*** 
 (0) (0) (0) 
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Number of elective claims 
(ln) 
0.00572*** 0.00680*** 0.00364*** 
 (0) (0) (3.94e-10) 
Number of nonelective (ln) -0.000472 0.00365*** 0.00166* 
 (0.417) (5.39e-07) (0.0586) 
Age -   
    
Rural 0.0921*** 0.0795*** 0.0703*** 
 (0) (0) (0) 
Northeast -0.0507*** -0.0613*** -0.0518*** 
 (2.01e-05) (0) (0) 
South -0.105*** -0.0879*** -0.0846*** 
 (0) (0) (0) 
West -0.0569*** -0.101*** -0.0924*** 
 (2.83e-07) (0) (0) 
Cardiology -0.0407*** 0.0430*** 0.0426*** 
 (2.61e-07) (0) (0) 
Dermatology -0.0455* -0.104*** -0.137*** 
 (0.0911) (0) (0) 
Diagnostic Radiology 0.0154 0.396*** 0.277*** 
 (0.710) (0) (0) 
Gastroenterology -0.0528*** -0.110*** -0.0856*** 
 (1.47e-06) (0) (0) 
Neurology -0.0180 -0.0236*** -0.0162*** 
 (0.377) (0) (2.47e-07) 
OBGYN -0.00604 -0.190*** -0.166*** 
 (0.802) (0) (0) 
Otolaryngology 0.0357 -0.0949*** -0.0881*** 
 (0.227) (0) (0) 
Psychiatry 0.00757 -0.0941*** -0.0786*** 
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 (0.811) (0) (0) 
Surgery -0.0170 -0.103*** -0.0824*** 
 (0.129) (0) (0) 
Urology -0.0283 -0.0695*** -0.0644*** 
 (0.384) (0) (0) 
Age  -0.00231*** -0.00224*** 
  (0) (0) 
Constant 0.397*** 1.103***  
 (0) (0)  
    
Observations 1,737,678 1,737,678 1,737,678 
R-squared 0.851 0.125  
 
Notes: Estimates for Logit are marginal effects. The reported estimates for the linear probability 
models (LPMs) with and without fixed effects (FEs) are coefficients. P-values are listed below 
each estimate. Marginal effects for various specifications can be found in Appendix eTable 4. 
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Appendix 1.4. Average Marginal Effects of HOPD Ratio in Different Specifications 
Specification Marginal Effect 
 
95% CI Lower 
Limit 
95% CI Upper 
Limit 
Ratio, ratio squared, ratio 
cubed (preferred) 0.0047 0.0019 0.0075 
Ratio, ratio squared 0.0051 0.0023 0.0079 
Ratio 0.0097 0.0076 0.0118 
HOPD-Office differential 
measured in thousands of 
dollars 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 
1-year lagged ratio 0.0000 -0.0009 0.0009 
1-year lagged ratio, ratio, 
ratio squared, ratio cubed -0.0023 -0.0054 0.0007 
Ratio, ratio squared, ratio 
cubed with oncologists 0.0033 0.0005 0.0061 
Ratio, ratio squared, ratio 
cubed, oncologists only -0.1009 -0.1284 -0.0734 
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Appendix 1.5. Histogram of HOPD Ratio 
 
Note: HOPD Ratio indicates the relative reimbursement value of physician services performed in 
the hospital outpatient department (HOPD) compared to equivalent services in a physician 
office. A ratio of 2 indicates that the reimbursement was twice as large in the HOPD as 
compared to the office. We Winsorized the ratio at the 1st and 99th percentiles. This figure 
displays data for all physician years from 2010-2015 (n=1,737,678). The 25th percentile is 1.64 
and the 75th percentile is 2.01. 
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Appendix 1.6. Average HOPD Ratios and Percentiles by Specialty 
  Percentile 
Medical Specialty Average 
HOPD 
Ratio 
  
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Full Sample 1.85 1.52 1.64 1.74 2.01 2.37 
Cardiology 1.59 1.32 1.50 1.61 1.68 1.79 
Dermatology 1.88 1.58 1.73 1.85 2.01 2.19 
Diagnostic Radiology 1.79 1.16 1.44 1.74 2.09 2.44 
Gastroenterology 2.15 1.94 2.04 2.14 2.26 2.38 
Neurology 1.72 1.51 1.62 1.68 1.76 1.93 
OBGYN 1.96 1.43 1.66 1.83 2.21 2.74 
Otolaryngology 1.96 1.62 1.74 1.90 2.13 2.39 
Primary Care 1.72 1.53 1.63 1.69 1.78 1.95 
Psychiatry 1.75 1.48 1.61 1.70 1.89 2.01 
Surgery 2.09 1.61 1.77 2.06 2.36 2.65 
Urology 2.44 2.05 2.23 2.42 2.64 2.89 
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Appendix 1.7. Average Effects of a 25th-to-75th percentile change in HOPD Ratio 
Medical Specialty Average 
Marginal 
Effect of 1-
Unit 
Change 
25th-to-
75th Unit 
Change 
Marginal 
Effect of 
25th-to-
75th 
95% CI 
Lower 
Limit 
95% CI 
Upper 
Limit 
Full Sample 0.0047 0.3699 0.0017 0.0007 0.0028 
Cardiology -0.085 0.182 -0.015 -0.018 -0.013 
Dermatology 0.002 0.284 0.001 -0.004 0.005 
Diagnostic Radiology -0.018 0.652 -0.012 -0.027 0.003 
Gastroenterology 0.019 0.218 0.004 -0.001 0.009 
Neurology 0.002 0.135 0.000 -0.004 0.004 
OBGYN 0.005 0.550 0.003 0.001 0.005 
Otolaryngology 0.013 0.387 0.005 0.001 0.009 
Primary Care 0.031 0.144 0.004 0.003 0.006 
Psychiatry -0.002 0.280 -0.001 -0.007 0.006 
Surgery -0.007 0.589 -0.004 -0.006 -0.002 
Urology 0.005 0.411 0.002 -0.003 0.007 
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Appendix 1.8. Measuring Vertical Integration and the HOPD Ratio 
Measuring Vertical Integration 
We defined integration using a strategy developed by Neprash and colleagues. They utilize the 
place of service codes found in Medicare claims. During our study period, when a hospital 
acquired a physician, the physician became eligible to bill under the Hospital Outpatient 
Department (HOPD) place of service code. The incentives to make this billing change were 
strong, since reimbursement under an HOPD designation was often higher than under an office 
designation. We created an indicator for each physician in each year to indicate integration status 
by counting the number of line items billed in the Medicare Carrier (physician/supplier) claims 
under an office code and under an HOPD code. When 75 percent or more of these line items 
were billed under an HOPD code, we classified the physician as integrated. In addition to the 
Carrier claims, Neprash and colleagues also used the Outpatient claims to reclassify some Carrier 
claims that were likely miscategorized as having taken place in the office setting. We do not take 
this additional step because the number of reclassified claims was small (2-3%). Their eMethods 
(2015) contains a clear explanation of the details in their approach. In addition, we use MD-
PPAS data to supplement the claims-based approach. If a physician’s tax identifier legal name 
contains the keywords “medical center,” “hospital,” “system,” “health science center,” “health 
sciences center,” or “med ctr,” we identify them as integrated. 
Measuring the HOPD Ratio 
We did not include all HCPCS codes in our measurement of the HOPD ratio, because some 
procedures can only be performed in certain settings; for example, open heart surgery cannot be 
performed or reimbursed in an office. For our research question, we were interested in the set of 
services that could be performed in either an office or in an HOPD. Rather than making clinical 
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judgments about the appropriateness of place of service for each of the 10,000+ procedures in the 
HCPCS system, we took an empirical approach: we used only those HCPCS codes which, 
nationally, were performed at least 5 percent of the time under both office and HOPD place of 
service codes. Many procedures fall into these groups: they are nearly always (or, very rarely) 
performed in one place or the other. We infer that such procedures are not suitably transferable 
between settings, and therefore exclude them. In addition, since we must compare revenue 
potential, we only used HCPCS codes for which Medicare lists prices in both the office and 
HOPD settings. We identified 1,436 HCPCS codes that met our criteria in 2010 and similar 
numbers for years 2011-2015. We Winsorized the HOPD ratio at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
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Chapter 2 Abstract 
 
Over 40 percent of physicians are employed by hospital systems. Hospital-physician vertical 
integration has raised concerns about spiraling health care prices, stagnant quality of care, and a 
changing landscape for the future of the health care workforce. This changing landscape is 
particularly important for primary care physicians, who serve as the front line for both patient 
care and efforts to reform the delivery system. In this research, we examined an understudied 
aspect of vertical integration: the clinical output of primary care physicians after integration with 
a hospital. We used detailed longitudinal data from Medicare claims and merged it with the 
American Medical Association Masterfile to assess several measures of physician output among 
74,975 primary care physicians from 2010-2016. We used a difference-in-differences analysis to 
compare physician-generated claims, professional revenue, work relative value units (RVUs), 
and number of patients served between physicians who integrated with hospital systems and 
those who did not. Among 4,733 integrating physicians, integration reduced the volume of 
physician claims by 17% (p < .001) and RVUs by 10% (p < .001). These reductions were 
especially pronounced in the first year of integration (-21% and -13%) and persisted in smaller 
magnitudes through the entire study period (-13% and -5% by the seventh year post-integration). 
Integration reduced professional fee revenue by an average of $32,495 per primary care 
physician per year (22%, p < .001), and reduced the number of Medicare patients treated by 
primary care physicians by an average of 22 (6%, p < .001) compared to non-integrating 
physicians. We also compared the declines in clinical output across small and large practices as 
well as rural and non-rural practices. Our results imply that vertical integration may reduce the 
incentives for physicians to deliver higher volumes of care. Further, vertical integration may 
make it more difficult for Medicare patients to access primary care. Finally, these findings 
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inform future work on the profitability and sustainability of vertically integrated hospital-
physician organizations.  
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Introduction 
 
Over the last decade, American hospitals have acquired physician practices in large numbers and 
have become major employers of physicians.1–3 As of 2018, hospitals owned 31.2 percent of 
physician practices, up from 13.6 percent in 2012.2 Observers have offered numerous rationales 
that could explain this large shift in the provider landscape toward “vertical integration” of 
hospitals and doctors: younger physicians prefer a greater work-life balance; coordinating health 
services across inpatient and outpatient settings has become more important with the 
proliferation of alternative payment models; integrated provider systems may confer a bargaining 
advantage in negotiations with commercial insurers; and payment for services delivered in 
hospital-owned practices is higher than payment for services in physician-owned practices. 
Recent research suggests that vertical integration has increased prices and not improved quality. 
4–10 However, the effect of integration on physician clinical output remains understudied. This is 
critical for two reasons: first, physician clinical output is one of the key ways that hospitals may 
recoup their investments in physician practices. Most of the value of a physician practice comes 
from the work that physicians do. Integration could streamline administrative processes to give 
physicians more time to spend treating patients, thus increasing clinical output. Second, 
increased physician clinical output under integration, particularly in primary care, could mean 
expanded access to valuable care among Medicare beneficiaries.  
In this paper, we seek to fill this gap. We examine the effects of integration on a large, nationally 
representative sample of primary care physicians. Primary care physicians work in a unique 
clinical environment: they are the main point of contact in the health care system for most 
patients, and they serve as the gateway to specialty care. From a policy point of view, this makes 
them an essential part of any effort to reform the delivery system. From a hospital management 
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point of view, primary care physicians generate referrals to lucrative tertiary services, making 
them attractive as investments. We make use of a unique dataset by linking multiple physician 
characteristics files to seven years of Medicare claims data over a period that exhibited 
significant integration activity (2010-2016). The resulting dataset is a fully balanced panel of 
about one-third of all U.S. primary care physicians. We find that integration reduces professional 
fees by 22%, the volume of physician claims by 17%, RVUs by 10%, and unique Medicare 
patients by 6%. These reductions were especially pronounced in the first year of integration. 
This analysis makes several contributions to the existing literature. First, it is the first study to 
examine the effect of vertical integration on the clinical output of primary care physicians. 
Second, it uses Medicare claims to generate a seven-year physician-level panel dataset. This 
offers several advantages; we can control for unobservable heterogeneity to a greater degree than 
other similar studies through physician fixed effects; the long study period allows us to more 
rigorously examine the parallel trends assumption of our difference-in-differences model; and 
inferences from this large sample of physicians have national implications. Third, we use 
multiple measures of clinical output – number of claims, professional revenue, relative value 
units, and number of unique patients treated – to address the concept of clinical output from 
multiple stakeholder perspectives. Because complete claims are required for payment, and our 
measures are claims-based, our clinical output measures are also likely to be valid.  
This study also has several important implications. First, because integration leads to declines in 
physician clinical output among Medicare patients, hospitals could be losing money on practice 
acquisitions. If hospitals are recouping their investments, they are most likely doing so through 
the avenues of higher negotiated commercial reimbursement, facility fees, or referral capture. 
Second, integration could reduce access to care among Medicare beneficiaries. Third, because 
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the declines in clinical output are heterogeneous across small and rural practices, integration may 
exacerbate existing disparities in geographic health care access. 
Defining Clinical Output 
 
Our operational definition of clinical output includes measures of the number of Medicare claims 
generated, the size of professional fees, the work “relative value units” of billed care as defined 
by the American Medical Association, and the number of unique patients treated. These 
measures are critically important, as they directly affect access to care and health care spending 
and are often used in compensation contracts. While the production of health, or quality, is 
central to patient welfare, it is not the focus of our investigation.  
Primary Care and Vertical Integration 
 
Primary care physicians play a key role in the delivery of health services. They also play an 
important role in hospital strategies for clinical excellence and business performance. In previous 
decades, hospitals acquired primary care practices to “capture lives,” or to increase the likelihood 
that primary care physicians would refer their patients to hospital-owned facilities and 
specialists. 11 This rationale persists today, with the additional impetus that integrating with 
primary care practices might equip delivery systems for participation in new payment models 
such as accountable care organizations.12 These reasons make primary care physicians essential 
from both a clinical and policy point of view. 
Institutional Context: Medicare Payment Policy and Vertical Integration 
 
Medicare’s fee-for-service outpatient payment policy reimburses physicians using the Physician 
Fee Schedule (PFS), a roster of procedure codes tied to specific physician services delivered to 
patients. The value of each procedure code in the PFS includes a designated amount for the 
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physician’s labor (the work RVUs), the overhead costs associated with a physician’s office, 
malpractice insurance costs, and a geographic adjuster. When in a physician-owned practice, 
Medicare pays physicians for each of these components exclusively through the PFS. When, 
however, a hospital acquires a physician practice, the reimbursement comes in two forms: the 
PFS, and the Medicare Outpatient Prospective Payment System (OPPS). Integrated physicians 
continue to bill Medicare for their labor per the PFS, but without the reimbursement for overhead 
costs or malpractice insurance costs. To cover these costs, Medicare pays a procedure-specific 
facility fee to the hospital as specified in the OPPS. The facility fee is generally agreed to be 
larger than the foregone components of the PFS; some have suggested hospitals and physicians 
integrate explicitly to take advantage of this payment system.13 As a result, reimbursement 
revenue from professional fees declines after integration while total reimbursement revenue 
increases. 
Theory of The Relationship Between Vertical Integration and Clinical output 
 
Hospital Perspective 
We conceptualize the hospital acquisition of a physician practice as having both a financial 
aspect and a strategic component. In the first instance, hospitals behave as profit-maximizers; 
even non-profit hospitals are unlikely to pursue business strategies that causes persistent 
financial losses. Correspondingly, it is reasonable to assume that hospitals expect a financial 
return on their investments in physician practices. Given that the financial value of a practice 
derives largely from the amount of care its physicians deliver, physician clinical output 
constitutes one of the key sources for hospital return on investment. Through integration, 
hospitals may seek to increase the total volume of care that physicians deliver. In fact, agency-
based economic theory about vertical integration would predict such behavior. Under this theory, 
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two independent firms may experience misaligned incentives or a “principal-agent” problem, but 
under common ownership, this problem is resolved. Here, hospitals benefit from facility 
revenues whenever physicians perform services in their facilities. However, when operating as 
separate organizations, physicians do not share in those revenues, leading to (from the hospital’s 
point of view) an undersupply of services. Under integration, hospitals and physicians both seek 
to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs to their shared organization; integration has 
been shown, for example, to increase the probability that employed physicians refer their patients 
to their employer hospital.14 Physician clinical output should, under this framework, increase 
with hospital integration. There is also a strategic component to integration that goes beyond 
narrow financial considerations. Economic theory also posits that vertical integration may serve 
to block competitors from access to key inputs; here, the key inputs are physicians, without 
which hospitals can produce very few health services. This strategy is known as “vertical 
foreclosure,” and some empirical work in hospital-physician vertical integration is consistent 
with hospitals behaving in this way, though it is difficult to test directly.15 Vertical foreclosure 
causes declines in market competitiveness, and in this context, would mean increases in prices 
that hospitals negotiate from commercial insurers. Modifying physician clinical output would not 
be the primary goal of hospital acquisitions; predictions about output from this framework are 
ambiguous. An additional strategic consideration that is important in clinical settings is grounded 
in dynamic capabilities theory. In this theory, firms use integration as a strategy to develop 
capabilities that confer a competitive advantage in rapidly changing environments.16 Thus, 
hospitals may seek to integrate with physicians in order to produce higher quality care; better 
coordinate between the inpatient and post-acute care settings; or standardize treatment protocols 
for patients in their system. The predictions from dynamic capabilities strategy are ambiguous 
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with respect to physician clinical output. Capabilities in the integrated firm may promote 
efficiency and reduce duplicative care, driving down measures of clinical output; or they may 
allow the integrated firm to more easily coordinate lucrative imaging and elective procedures. A 
final strategic consideration is that delivery systems may integrate to increase their bargaining 
power with commercial insurers. Among integrating delivery systems, improved bargaining 
power with commercial insurers could drive prices higher, which would raise the value of a 
commercial patient relative to a Medicare patient. This change in relative value could induce 
integrated delivery systems may seek to shift care away from Medicare patients and toward 
commercial patients. Rural communities serve a larger proportion of Medicare and Medicaid 
patients than their non-rural counterparts. In rural areas, we hypothesize that the relative scarcity 
of commercial patients makes this “payer-shifting” strategy less viable. If so, rural physicians 
who integrate should exhibit a smaller decline in Medicare activity compared to their non-rural 
counterparts. 
Physician Perspective 
We conceptualize integrating physicians as individuals offering their services under different 
employment scenarios. From a contractual perspective, integration could replace strong 
incentives to produce clinical output with weaker ones. Many physicians in independent 
practices have strong productivity incentives that encourage seeing many patients: compensation 
in most physician-owned practices depends in part (in about a quarter of practices, exclusively) 
on fee-for-service productivity.17,18 Under hospital integration, the marginal incentive to provide 
additional care may be weaker, with productivity-based compensation replaced by a salary 
model that reduces the personal return to billing more services.11,17 If these incentives prevail, 
then physician clinical output is likely to fall after a hospital acquisition.  
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Physicians in solo practices have the sharpest incentives for clinical output: they are the residual 
claimant to the profits made by the practice. By contrast, the incentives among physicians in 
larger groups are less sharp, since compensation derives from both salary and productivity 
components.19 For this reason, we anticipate larger declines in clinical output among physicians 
in small practices who join hospital systems compared to the declines in clinical output among 
physicians in large practices who join hospital systems. This result would be consistent with the 
hypothesis that hospital-employed physicians respond to the weaker volume incentives under 
salaried hospital arrangements.  
Review of Related Literature 
 
This study is informed by previous work on hospital-physician vertical integration as well as the 
broader literature on physician responses to financial incentives. Studies have explored the 
relationship between integration and prices, spending, and quality. Most have found that prices 
and spending are higher among hospital-owned physicians, although the magnitudes vary 
considerably.5,9 Some research found that integration increased spending by several percentage 
points6,7 while others estimated that among Medicare beneficiaries, spending increased by as 
much as 18 percent per patient.20 A related study found that integrated cardiologists increased the 
intensity of treatments for their patients.8 Moreover, most of the studies of vertical integration 
and quality have found small or insignificant effects of integration on improvements in patient 
screening, outcomes, or mortality.15 Together, these results imply that integration may have a 
causal effect on prices, utilization, and spending while doing little to improve quality. 
Vertical integration with hospitals also involves changes in physician financial incentives. The 
relationship between physicians’ financial incentives and their behavior has long received 
attention in health economics. Emanuel and Fuchs argue that the fee-for-service payment system 
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creates physician incentives to do more even when there is “a slim clinical rationale for an 
intervention.”21 Clemens and Gottlieb find that physician financial incentives are an important 
determinant of the volume and composition of care delivered, especially among procedures over 
which physicians have more discretion.22 Coey observed a large response by physicians to the 
size of the payments for heart attack treatments, leading to overly aggressive treatment styles.23 
Yet only one study has explicitly explored how physician clinical output responds to the 
incentives of vertical integration. Using survey data from a cardiologist association, Chunn and 
colleagues found that hospital integration was associated with considerably higher compensation 
($129,263, or about 25 percent) and roughly four percent lower work RVUs compared to 
independent practices. The authors suggest that hospitals may engage in “bidding wars” for 
desirable practices, driving up wages for integrated cardiologists.24 This result may help to 
explain the finding that hospitals usually suffer losses in the first several years following a 
physician practice acquisition.1 
While the above theory and empirical work provide a foundation for the present study, important 
limitations remain. The lone study that examines clinical output has a relatively small sample 
size (n=13,642 physician-years); is limited to cardiologists, a specialty which may lack 
generalizability to other physicians; and due to survey non-response, its authors are unable to 
create a balanced panel to fully control for potentially endogenous physician characteristics. 
Moreover, the clinical output effects of integration within the Medicare population are unknown; 
this is particularly important because higher commercial prices achieved through integration 
provide incentives to substitute Medicare patients for commercial patients. Finally, little is 
known about the implications of integration among primary care physicians. As the cornerstone 
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and gatekeepers of the health system for most patients, primary care practices serve a key role in 
patient access to care. 
Methods 
Data 
 
We created a robust analytical sample by linking the following seven data sources: Medicare 
Carrier line items from 2010-2016, Medicare Data on Provider Practice and Specialty (MD-
PPAS), the American Medical Association Physician Masterfile, Medicare Provider Analysis 
and Review (MedPAR) data, Medicare Physician Fee Schedules, Medicare Outpatient 
Prospective Payment System files, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture commuting zone 
files. The procedure we used to create the analytical file is described in Appendix 2.1. 
Our resulting file contained over 3 million physician-year observations. We applied a series of 
exclusion and inclusion criteria (Appendix 2.2). Of the 1,856,627 physician-year observations 
that remained after these criteria, 671,966 were primary care physicians as categorized by MD-
PPAS. Since this study is concerned with identifying the effect of integration on those who leave 
office settings to join hospital systems, we used only physicians who were unintegrated in the 
base year (2010), remained in the sample through 2016, and did not dis-integrate at any time. 
The resulting analytical file included 4,733 integrating primary care physician-years (the 
treatment group) and 70,242 primary care physician-years who remained unintegrated 
throughout the study period (the control group). The sample characteristics are presented in 
Table 2.1. 
Model 
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We evaluated the effect of integration using a difference-in-differences (DD) methodology. A 
classic DD involves a common start date. In our application, no such common start date exists: 
some physicians integrated with hospitals as early as 2010, while others remained unintegrated 
until 2016. We centered each physician’s integration start dates around t = 0, where t = 1 
indicated the first full year of integration. The control group, similarly, lacked a start date. We 
assigned the control group to artificial start dates by randomizing each control physician to a 
starting year, then created a corresponding t variable. The probability of assigning a physician in 
the control group to a starting calendar year was based on the proportion of physicians who 
integrated in each calendar year. This allowed us to compare the treatment group to the control 
group along a common time scale.  
We used physician fixed effects to address unobserved time-invariant physician characteristics 
that may have been correlated with integration and clinical output. The identifying assumptions 
for causal inference in DD models are parallel trends and common shocks. The parallel trends 
assumption requires that the control group serve as a good counterfactual to the treatment group: 
in the absence of treatment, the treated group would have continued along the same trend as the 
control group. This assumption, though untestable, is given more credence by demonstrating that 
the two groups followed parallel trends in the pre-period, suggesting that they could have 
plausibly continued in the same manner without treatment. Under the common shocks 
assumption, any shocks that might alter the outcomes for either the treated group and control are 
common to both – that is, there is no shock (such as legislation, policy, or economic disruptions) 
that differentially affects the outcomes of the treated group. 
We verified that the pre-period trends were parallel. Figure 2.1 contains a visual depiction of the 
two groups set along the time-to-integration axis. For completeness, we also examined these 
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results by annual integrating cohort: those who integrated in 2010, in 2011, through 2016 
(Appendix 2.3). With minimal exceptions across study outcomes and treated cohorts, parallel 
trends appeared to be consistently present. In our analysis, we also made the common shocks 
assumption: that any shock to the study subjects in the post-period was experienced by both the 
treatment and control groups. The analysis was focused on primary care physicians, so there was 
no risk of specialty-specific shocks that would differentially affect one group comprised of, for 
example, a disproportionate number of specialists. Further, the observable characteristics 
suggested that treated and control groups in the pre-period had similar distributions of sex, age, 
and practice size. 
Our model specification allowed us to estimate heterogeneous effects by time period (i.e., leads 
and lags). We controlled for the calendar year of the observation as well as the competitiveness 
of the hospital market and the physician market. The parameters of interest were the fully-
interacted time variable and treatment variable.  
We estimated the leads and lags effects model for physician i in integration year t:  
(1) 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽𝑗(𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑖 ∗
7
𝑗=−6 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡) + 𝜏𝑗𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝛿𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜋𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 was any of the four dependent variables. 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑖 took the value of 1 if the physician 
was in the integration group and 0 otherwise, while 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 took the value of 1 if the observation 
occurred in time to integration t for physician i. The treatment effects were contained in the 
vector 𝛽𝑗 where 𝑗 > 0.  𝛽1 was the effect of integration on output in the first full year of 
integration (contemporaneous treatment), while 𝛽2 through 𝛽7 gave the effects for the 
subsequent periods (i.e., the lagged effects). The overall treatment effect was estimated by taking 
an observation-weighted average of the lagged effects. Our model also provided estimates for 
  
53 
 
possible leading effects in each pre-period, i.e., changes in current output associated with 
anticipation of future treatment. These estimates were given by the vector 𝛽𝑗 where 𝑗 ≤ 0. This 
aided our examination of our identification strategy: if the coefficients of leading effects were 
significantly different from zero, it would have suggested a violation of parallel trends between 
the treated and untreated groups in the pre-period. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 includes hospital and physician 
Hirschman-Herfindahl Indices. We included calendar year (𝛿𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡), time to integration 
(𝜏𝑗𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡) and physician (𝜋𝜇𝑖) fixed effects to identify the treatment effect using within-
physician variation over time. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is a physician-year level error term.  
We estimated the heterogeneous effects of integration by practice size using Equation (1) for two 
groups (physicians in the first and fourth quartiles of practice size) and comparing their 𝛽𝑗 
parameter estimates. We also estimated the heterogeneous effects of integration on rural and 
non-rural practices using Equation (1) and comparing their 𝛽𝑗 parameter estimates.  
In all specifications, we estimated linear models with standard errors robust to physician-level 
clustering.  
Results 
 
We identified 524,825 physician-year observations (74,975 unique primary care physicians) that 
met our criteria between January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2016. Table 2.1 displays unadjusted 
descriptive statistics of our study sample for the pre-period and post-period among the 
integrating (n=4,733) and comparison (n=70,242) groups. Integrating physicians were slightly 
younger (an average of 50 years old compared to 51 years old). They were more likely to be 
female (34 percent versus 30 percent), from the Midwest (44 percent versus 21 percent), and 
much more likely to practice in a rural area (36 percent of integrating physicians were in rural 
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areas, compared to 18 percent of control physicians). The pre-period number of Medicare claims 
and revenue is somewhat lower among integrating physicians (1,426 compared to 1586, and 
$121,201 compared to $147,185). Similarly, the number of RVUs billed by integrating 
physicians was slightly lower (1,178 compared to 1,434). However, integrating physicians 
treated about 6 percent more unique patients than non-integrating physicians (368 compared to 
348). At the time of integration, the median practice size was 3 physicians, with a 25th percentile 
of 1 and a 75th percentile of 21 (Appendix 2.4). 
In our DD analysis, we detected large negative effects of integration on clinical output (Figure 
2.1). This was true across all measures. Medicare claims volume declined among comparison 
physicians, but decreased by much more among integrating physicians (DD estimate: -261, 95% 
CI: -291 to -230). This implies a 17 percent decline in claims volume (Table 2.2). We also 
observed a large decline in Medicare revenue from professional fees, where the decline among 
integrating physicians’ revenue contrasted with an increase in professional fees among the 
comparison physicians for an adjusted DD estimate of -32,495 (95% CI: -36,194 to -28,796), 
implying a 22 percent reduction. After integration, physicians also billed fewer work relative 
value units compared to the comparison group (-145, 95% CI: -170 to -119) for a decline of 10 
percent. Similarly, physicians saw about 6 percent fewer patients after integration (-22, 95% CI: 
-28 to -15). 
We found treatment effect heterogeneity by time period (Figure 2.1; see also Appendix 2.5). The 
first full year of integration exhibited the largest declines, with subsequent years showing less 
extreme treatment effects. This pattern was true for the outcomes of claims volume (e.g., first 
year: -324, 95% CI: -192 to -147; sixth year: -270, 95% CI: -322 to -218), RVUs, and patients 
treated. This could have occurred if integrating physicians took time to adjust to a new practice 
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environment, slowly ramping up their billing and patient visits over time. However, even five 
and six years after integration, the level of output remained below that of control physicians. For 
professional revenue, the gap between control physicians and integrating physicians was 
approximately constant over time (first year: -37,784, 95% CI: -41,761 to -33,806; sixth year: -
37,831, 95% CI: -43,437 to -32,224). 
We also found heterogeneity by physician characteristics (results for claims volume shown in 
Figure 2.2; see Appendix 2.6 for other dependent variables). As expected, pre-period levels of 
output were higher among small practice physicians (annual claims volume=1,692) than large 
practice physicians (annual claims volume=1,245). In percentage terms, the declines in claims 
between small and large practices were similar (-19 percent and -22 percent), although 
integrating physicians from small practices, given their higher baseline levels of output, 
exhibited larger total declines than integrating physicians from large practices (-321 and -268) 
(Table 2.2). Professional revenue fell by a larger magnitude among small practices, although the 
percentage change was smaller (-26 percent among small practices and -32 percent among large 
practices). RVUs declined among small practices and large practices (-15 percent and -9 
percent). The number of treated patients declined in both small and large groups (-5 percent and -
10 percent). These results imply output declines among solo practitioners that, while comparable 
to or smaller than physicians from large practices in percentage terms, were often larger in 
magnitude (the RVU decline was about 2.5 times larger). 
Integrating rural physicians exhibited declines in clinical output across all four measures. Claims 
fell by 337 (-17 percent), revenue by $43,224 (-28 percent), RVUs by 198 (-13 percent) and 
patients by 25 (-6 percent). Clinical output also fell among non-rural physicians. Comparing 
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these two groups showed that rural physicians’ clinical output fell by larger amounts both in 
percentage terms and in absolute terms compared to their non-rural counterparts.  
Discussion 
 
In this study, we found evidence that hospital-physician vertical integration reduced primary care 
physician clinical output among Medicare patients. Integration was associated with fewer 
Medicare claims and large declines in physicians’ professional revenue. Integration also reduced 
physician RVUs. Finally, integration led to a decline in the number of patients treated. Together, 
these findings imply that hospital-physician vertical integration reduces physician clinical output 
and potentially reduces Medicare patient access by statistically and economically significant 
amounts.  
At least two mechanisms could underlie these findings. First, these results could imply a 
straightforward explanation about contractual incentives under different organizational types. In 
this explanation, hospital employment contract incentives result in an aggregate decline in the 
clinical productivity of physicians in integrated settings relative to non-integrated settings. While 
we do not directly observe employment contract details, hospital employers tend to compensate 
physicians through salary to a greater degree than private practice, which tends to emphasize 
volume in compensation. Salaried physicians face weaker marginal incentives to treat additional 
patients or perform additional services. Among physicians who had an ownership stake in the 
practice, hospital acquisition also removes their status as the residual claimant to the business 
profits. Together, these effects would lead one to expect a decline in clinical output under 
hospital employment, which we observe here. 
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Second, these findings could imply a nuanced change in clinical output that intersects with 
strategic organizational goals of delivery systems. The observed decline in care offered to 
Medicare beneficiaries could be offset by additional care offered to commercially-insured 
patients. This analysis of Medicare data cannot answer that question directly, but existing 
literature suggests a rationale: researchers have concluded that hospital-physician vertical 
integration causes increases in commercially-insured prices. Integration may therefore raise the 
value of commercially-insured patients relative to Medicare patients. If so, delivery systems 
might seek to substitute between payers. This payer-shifting explanation hinges on the ability of 
delivery systems to influence the patients that physicians treat. Delivery systems may well 
possess that ability: following integration, many non-clinical components of the practice become 
centralized at the delivery system level; in fact, physicians cite fatigue with billing, scheduling, 
and other administrative tasks as reasons to work for a hospital rather than practice 
independently. If the delivery system becomes responsible for scheduling appointments, they 
may make more appointments available for commercial patients and limit availability for 
Medicare patients. Our results, however, do not support the payer-shifting hypothesis. Rural 
areas tend to have more Medicare patients and fewer commercial patients, implying less ability 
to payer-shift, which should result in smaller declines relative to their non-rural counterparts. We 
find the opposite: integrating rural physicians reduce their clinical output by larger amounts. Our 
rural analysis indicates that primary care physicians in rural areas serve a large number of 
patients every year – an average of 422 patients per physician per year, compared to 328 among 
non-rural physicians. However, given the sizable integration-related declines that we observe in 
claims, professional revenue, RVUs, and patients treated, integration appears to exert a large 
contractionary effect on the supply of health care in rural communities. 
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The results also have implications for hospitals and delivery systems. Hospitals do not appear to 
be recouping their investment through increases in the professional services of acquired 
physicians. This suggests that if acquisitions are profitable, there are compensating effects from 
(1) commercial price or volume increases, (2) referrals, or (3) facility fees. Each of these could 
be enough to make up for the loss in professional revenue, but this is unknown. Estimating the 
magnitude of these is a subject worthy of further research. The analysis in the present study does 
not rule out the possibility that hospitals are losing money on their investments. The total 
financial value of physician activity could decline under integration. If all care – referrals, tests, 
care for non-Medicare patients – were to decline by the same magnitude as the observed 10 
percent RVU decline, hospitals could be losing considerable sums per physician per year. While 
acquisition negotiations are strictly confidential, it is possible that hospitals also pay a purchase 
price for the practice itself, which they would need to pay off in addition to new salary expenses 
and annual losses of output. In short, one possibility is that for hospitals, vertical integration 
might be driven by strategic considerations, such as vertical foreclosure or dynamic capabilities, 
as much as short-term financial considerations. Another possibility is that primary care 
physicians may practice differently in integrated environments. It may be easier to refer patients 
to other procedures, including lucrative elective surgeries, when such resources are located 
within the same organizational body. A shift toward more specialty care and/or surgery is 
consistent with reports in the literature that patient-level spending rises after integration.8,10,20,25 
These findings do not unconditionally cast in a bad light the role of vertical integration in patient 
care. Although integrating physicians reduce the care they deliver, they may be reducing 
wasteful or low-value care, which would be a welcome development in a health system known 
for its inefficiency.26,27 Further, we are unable with this data to observe how physicians allocate 
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their time in private practice and in hospital employment. It is possible that integrated physicians 
spend more time with patients, which could improve patient satisfaction or care quality. 
However, these results do suggest that integration makes it more difficult for Medicare patients 
to access care. 
The study has several important limitations. Most notably, it relies on Medicare fee-for-service 
claims data. Our analysis does not include Medicare Advantage, commercial insurance, or 
Medicaid claims. It is possible that while integrated physicians perform less care among 
Medicare fee-for-service patients, total physician clinical output remains constant by shifting to 
patients from other payers. Because our analysis does not include data from these other payers, 
we are unable to test whether integration causes payer-shifting. Future research should examine 
the degree to which integration is associated with compositional changes in the payer mix within 
a physician’s panel; some evidence suggests an association between integrated practices and the 
likelihood of accepting Medicaid patients.28 There are also advantages of Medicare data: it does 
not suffer from the problems associated with survey data; it yields a large, nationally 
representative sample; and because accurate completion of claims is required for physicians and 
hospitals to be paid, the measures of clinical output we use are likely to be valid. An additional 
limitation is that patient welfare is not present in this analysis. We do not measure quality of 
care, patient satisfaction, or patient costs. A full assessment of vertical integration would 
consider these factors. 
Future work can evaluate the explanatory power of vertical foreclosure theory by testing the 
extent to which rival hospitals experience declines in admissions, tests, or referrals following 
integration. Policymakers should discourage vertical integration to the extent that it causes 
foreclosure, as foreclosure reduces both competition and patient choice.29 Researchers may also 
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seek to evaluate dynamic capabilities theory by exploring whether organizational processes, 
financial metrics, or other hospital system performance indicators respond to integration. Testing 
the other mechanisms by which hospitals may recoup their investments, evaluating the payer-
shifting hypothesis (ideally with an all-payer claims database), and incorporating physician wage 
data are important next steps in this literature. Moreover, this paper suggests that the role of 
urban-rural differences and practice size in the causes and effects of integration has been 
overlooked. Finally, researchers interested in whether integration improves patient care should 
examine how the composition of services changes when physicians integrate. 
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Chapter 2 Exhibits 
 
Table 2.1. Sample Characteristics 
 Pre-integration Post-integration 
 Control Integrating Control Integrating 
     
N     
Physician-year observations 168982 11506 322712 21625 
Unique physicians 56423 3844 70242 4733 
Integrated with hospital 0 0 0 100 
Age(mean) 51 50 54 52 
Female(percent) 30 34 30 36 
Size of practice (number of physicians) 21 19 19 35 
Region     
Midwest 21 44 21 47 
Northeast 23 14 22 13 
South 35 28 35 24 
West 21 13 22 16 
Rural (percent) 18 36 18 33 
Medicare Claims Volume (mean) 1586 1426 1516 1009 
Medicare Professional Revenue (mean) 147185 121201 148486 84161 
Medicare Relative Value Units (mean) 1434 1178 1402 942 
Medicare Unique Patients (mean) 348 368 342 319 
HHI Hospital 1757 2142 1808 2136 
HHI Specialty 162 190 165 170 
Note: 
HHI - Hirschman-Herfindahl Index of hospital referral region; HOPD - Hospital Outpatient Department 
Sample comprised of physicians who begin the study period unintegrated. 
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Figure 2.1. Physician Productivity Before and After Vertical Integration 
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Table 2.2. Effects of Integration on Productivity Across Practice Types 
Measure Subgroup 
Pre-period 
level among 
integrating 
physicians 
Average effect of 
integration in post-period 
(magnitude) 
Average 
effect of 
integration in 
post-period 
(percentage) 
Annual number of claims Overall 1564 -261 (-291, -230) -17% 
 Small 1692 -321 (-390, -251) -19% 
 Large 1245 -268 (-324, -212) -22% 
 Rural 1928 -337 (-392, -282) -17% 
 Non-rural 1479 -202 (-238, -167) -14% 
Annual professional 
revenue Overall 144890 -32495 (-36194, -28796) -22% 
 Small 175606 -45225 (-57461, -32989) -26% 
 Large 97220 -30929 (-34418, -27441) -32% 
 Rural 157170 -43224 (-51091, -35357) -28% 
 Non-rural 142018 -26339 (-30102, -22575) -19% 
Annual relative value 
units Overall 1411 -145 (-170, -119) -10% 
 Small 1693 -247 (-312, -182) -15% 
 Large 1010 -90 (-121, -58) -9% 
 Rural 1571 -198 (-243, -152) -13% 
 Non-rural 1373 -116 (-147, -85) -8% 
Annual unique patients Overall 346 -22 (-28, -15) -6% 
 Small 342 -17 (-32, -2) -5% 
 Large 302 -31 (-41, -21) -10% 
 Rural 422 -25 (-37, -12) -6% 
 Non-rural 328 -17 (-24, -10) -5% 
     
Notes: Pre-period level calculated as the adjusted value of the final pre-period (t = -1). 
Average effect calculated as observation-weighted adjusted estimates where t >= 0. 
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Figure 2.2. Effects of Integration on Claims Volume, by Physician Characteristic 
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Chapter 2 Appendix 
 
Appendix 2.1. Construction of Analytical File and Measuring Vertical Integration 
 
Construction of Analytical File 
We began with a 20% sample of Medicare Carrier line items from 2009-2016. These files 
contain information on Medicare beneficiaries’ physician visits (Part B). Each year of these files 
includes approximately 300 million observations, containing information such as the procedure 
code for each service delivered, the place of service, and, importantly, the performing 
physician’s National Provider Identifier (NPI). From these files we constructed summary 
characteristics of each NPI in each year, including: the percentage of their services billed from an 
office and from a hospital outpatient department; the total amount of Medicare revenue billed 
and the sites of service from which it was billed; the specialty codes associated with the NPI; and 
geographic variables. We linked these annual NPI summary files to the American Medical 
Association Physician Masterfile, a proprietary dataset that indexes virtually all physicians in the 
United States. We kept the Carrier file claims that matched to a record in the Masterfile to 
include only physicians in the dataset. We merged the resulting files to Medicare Data on 
Provider Practice and Specialty (MD-PPAS). MD-PPAS is an annual data resource produced by 
CMS that contains provider specialty designations and several measures calculated from the 
100% Medicare claims files, including the number of unique patients a provider treats and the 
total volume of Medicare revenue. We linked the 2010-2016 annual MD-PPAS data to our 
merged Carrier-Masterfile summary files. We used Medicare Provider Analysis and Review 
(MedPAR) files from 2009-2016 to create measures of hospital market competitiveness. We 
used Medicare PFS and OPPS files to calculate the number of RVUs associated with each 
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physician’s procedures as found in the claims data, and summed them for each physician in each 
year. Using the numbers obtained from the 20% claims files, we multiplied the summed number 
of claims, amount of professional revenue, and RVUs by five in order to approximate the total 
annual values for these variables. We used the “number of unique patients” field in MD-PPAS 
for each physician in each year for the outcome of number of patients. We merged data from the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture by zip code to retrieve the commuting zone corresponding to 
each physician’s zip code. We classified each commuting zone along an urban-rural continuum: 
we took the average of the Rural-Urban Commuting Area codes, which range from 1 (highly 
urban) to 10 (highly rural) for each Census Tract within each county of the commuting zone.30,31 
we assigned commuting zones with an average RUCA score of 4 or greater to “rural” status, and 
all other commuting zones to non-rural status. We calculated each physician’s practice size at the 
time of integration using MD-PPAS tax identifier number information (TIN). For each TIN in 
each year, we calculated the number of unique NPIs. For each physician, practice size 
corresponded to the number of unique NPIs in that physician’s primary TIN for the year. 
Measuring Vertical Integration 
We defined integration using a strategy developed by Neprash and colleagues. They utilize the 
place of service codes found in Medicare claims. During our study period, when a hospital 
acquired a physician, the physician became eligible to bill under the Hospital Outpatient 
Department (HOPD) place of service code. The incentives to make this billing change were 
strong, since reimbursement under an HOPD designation was often higher than under an office 
designation. We created an indicator for each physician in each year to indicate integration status 
by counting the number of line items billed in the Medicare Carrier (physician/supplier) claims 
under an office code and under an HOPD code. When 75 percent or more of these line items 
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were billed under an HOPD code, we classified the physician as integrated. In addition to the 
Carrier claims, Neprash and colleagues also used the Outpatient claims to reclassify some Carrier 
claims that were likely miscategorized as having taken place in the office setting. We do not take 
this additional step because the number of reclassified claims was small (2-3%). Their eMethods 
(2015) contains a clear explanation of the details in their approach. In addition, we use MD-
PPAS data to supplement the claims-based approach. If a physician’s tax identifier legal name 
contains the keywords “medical center,” “hospital,” “system,” “health science center,” “health 
sciences center,” or “med ctr,” we identify them as integrated. 
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Appendix 2.2. Sample Flow Diagram 
Inclusion criteria Resulting Sample Size (Physician-Year 
observations) 
Provider NPI-years 2010-2016  4708481 
Appears in Medicare claims 4708481 
Appears in AMA Masterfile 3550511 
NPI valid length and format 3550504 
Exclude those with 10 or fewer line items 3462819 
Provider State Code in 50 U.S. States 3433121 
Exclude physicians with reported age range 
outside 20-85 3423989 
Keep physicians with populated specialty 
information 3064986 
Key variables populated (market 
concentration, rural, dependent variables, 
region) 2795181 
Appear in all 7 years 1946049 
MD-PPAS specialty is Primary Care 665214 
Keep physicians who never integrate and 
those who become permanently integrated 539386 
Appear in all 7 years after exclusions 524825 
Final sample size 524825 
Note: AMA – American Medical Association; MD-PPAS – Medicare Data on Provider Practice 
and Specialty; NPI – National Provider Identifier 
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Appendix 2.3. Dependent Variables Before and After Integration, by cohort year 
Panel A. Claims 
before and after 
integration, by 
cohort year 
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Panel B. Professional Revenue before and after integration, by cohort year 
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Panel C. Relative Value Units before and after integration, by cohort year 
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Panel D. Unique patients before and after integration, by cohort year 
 
  
  
76 
 
Appendix 2.4. Size of Practice at Time of Integration 
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Appendix 2.5. Physician Fixed-Effects Regression in Full Sample, all dependent variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Claims Revenue RVUs Patients 
     
Time = -5 104.9*** -3,744*** 44.98*** 7.215*** 
 (85.25 - 124.6) (-5,979 - -1,510) (28.54 - 61.43) (4.091 - 10.34) 
Time = -4 86.87*** -1,492** 38.13*** 5.417*** 
 (73.42 - 100.3) (-2,883 - -101.2) (26.93 - 49.33) (2.895 - 7.940) 
Time = -3 51.72*** -1,747*** 16.93*** 3.913*** 
 (41.91 - 61.53) (-2,717 - -776.8) (9.252 - 24.62) (2.357 - 5.468) 
Time = -2 26.86*** -800.8** 8.596*** 0.0406 
 (19.31 - 34.40) (-1,485 - -116.8) (3.519 - 13.67) (-1.327 - 1.408) 
Time = -1 (base)     
     
Time = 0 -23.35*** 744.5** -9.845*** -1.503** 
 (-29.69 - -17.01) (138.4 - 1,351) (-14.54 - -5.147) (-2.730 - -0.276) 
Time = 1 -51.42*** 1,418*** -21.68*** -2.132*** 
 (-58.96 - -43.89) (668.9 - 2,167) (-27.56 - -15.80) (-3.581 - -0.683) 
Time = 2 -77.80*** 2,090*** -34.19*** -3.799*** 
 (-88.51 - -67.08) (1,145 - 3,034) (-41.23 - -27.16) (-6.091 - -1.507) 
Time = 3 -98.22*** 2,978*** -43.69*** -4.441*** 
 (-113.7 - -82.70) (1,840 - 4,117) (-51.98 - -35.40) (-6.272 - -2.611) 
Time = 4 -122.0*** 3,689*** -56.63*** -6.830*** 
 (-145.3 - -98.68) (2,382 - 4,997) (-66.45 - -46.82) (-8.795 - -4.865) 
Time = 5 -138.6*** 5,311*** -58.52*** -7.896*** 
 (-168.1 - -109.2) (3,685 - 6,936) (-70.79 - -46.24) (-10.31 - -5.479) 
Time = 6 -169.3*** 5,977*** -65.96*** -8.827*** 
 (-193.0 - -145.7) (4,077 - 7,876) (-81.16 - -50.76) (-12.09 - -5.561) 
Leading Effects     
     
Treated group # time -5 64.90** 9,063*** 58.04** 8.827 
 (6.344 - 123.5) (3,065 - 15,060) (7.273 - 108.8) (-3.458 - 21.11) 
Treated group # time -4 44.84* 5,082** 56.15*** 16.29*** 
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 (-2.247 - 91.93) (496.1 - 9,667) (17.05 - 95.25) (4.581 - 27.99) 
Treated group # time -3 28.41 4,547** 43.36*** 4.665 
 (-6.663 - 63.47) (702.9 - 8,392) (13.50 - 73.22) (-2.329 - 11.66) 
Treated group # time -2 26.61** 1,378 20.84** 8.989*** 
 (0.717 - 52.50) (-1,031 - 3,787) (1.814 - 39.87) (3.608 - 14.37) 
Treated group # time -1 0 0 0 0 
     
Lagged Effects     
     
Treated group # time 0 -169.6*** -17,329*** -110.0*** -12.97*** 
 (-192.0 - -147.2) (-19,958 - -14,700) (-134.2 - -85.71) (-17.48 - -8.461) 
Treated group # time 1 -324.6*** -37,784*** -193.7*** -32.40*** 
 (-355.4 - -293.8) (-41,761 - -33,806) (-220.8 - -166.5) (-39.29 - -25.51) 
Treated group # time 2 -286.0*** -36,709*** -148.6*** -24.33*** 
 (-321.3 - -250.7) (-41,249 - -32,169) (-179.4 - -117.9) (-32.11 - -16.55) 
Treated group # time 3 -270.8*** -35,592*** -132.7*** -19.53*** 
 (-309.0 - -232.6) (-40,092 - -31,092) (-164.8 - -100.6) (-27.80 - -11.27) 
Treated group # time 4 -253.9*** -35,420*** -121.0*** -16.52*** 
 (-298.2 - -209.5) (-40,221 - -30,618) (-156.9 - -85.21) (-25.70 - -7.343) 
Treated group # time 5 -260.1*** -37,160*** -147.7*** -18.59*** 
 (-309.6 - -210.7) (-42,616 - -31,704) (-187.6 - -107.9) (-29.11 - -8.070) 
Treated group # time 6 -270.1*** -37,831*** -157.2*** -26.74*** 
 (-322.4 - -217.9) (-43,437 - -32,224) (-205.4 - -109.1) (-39.00 - -14.47) 
2011.year 34.04*** 5,705*** 12.29*** 20.28*** 
 (29.20 - 38.88) (5,173 - 6,237) (8.136 - 16.44) (19.09 - 21.47) 
2012.year 39.66*** 2,412*** 17.10*** 8.973*** 
 (32.85 - 46.47) (1,731 - 3,093) (11.75 - 22.46) (7.982 - 9.965) 
2013.year 53.33*** 4,011*** 38.09*** 21.68*** 
 (45.99 - 60.67) (3,280 - 4,742) (32.41 - 43.77) (19.67 - 23.68) 
2014.year 22.02*** 1,819*** 16.55*** 3.589*** 
 (15.25 - 28.79) (1,150 - 2,488) (11.25 - 21.86) (2.588 - 4.590) 
2015.year 17.71*** 4,888*** 8.607*** 2.608*** 
 (12.69 - 22.72) (4,365 - 5,412) (4.505 - 12.71) (1.844 - 3.371) 
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2016o.year - - - - 
     
HHI hospital (ln) 22.84 -924.2 14.52 8.522*** 
 (-5.337 - 51.02) (-3,419 - 1,571) (-2.829 - 31.87) (4.378 - 12.67) 
HHI physician (ln) 6.562 3,027*** 6.015 0.624 
 (-5.307 - 18.43) (1,537 - 4,517) (-1.999 - 14.03) (-1.041 - 2.288) 
Constant 1,348*** 135,957*** 1,267*** 273.7*** 
 (1,168 - 1,528) (120,013 - 151,902) (1,148 - 1,387) (244.7 - 302.7) 
     
Observations 524,825 524,825 524,825 524,638 
R-squared 0.816 0.874 0.882 0.839 
Robust ci in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 2.6. Effects of Integration on Dependent Variables, by Physician Characteristic 
Panel A. Revenue 
  
  
81 
 
Panel B. Relative Value Units 
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Panel C. Unique Patients 
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Chapter 3. Association of Coded Patient Severity with Hospital-Physician Vertical Integration 
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Chapter 3 Abstract 
 
Importance: Hospitals have rapidly acquired physician practices, but the effects of these 
vertically integrated provider systems on the coding of patient illness remain unclear.  
Methods: We used Medicare patient claims from 2010-2015 to evaluate whether patients treated 
by vertically integrated physicians exhibited differences in the levels and growth in patient 
clinical severity scores. We calculated patient-year hierarchical clinical condition (HCC) scores 
and used linear regression to evaluate the relationship between growth in HCC scores and 
vertical integration, adjusting for year, patient-level fixed effects, area and market characteristics, 
and physician age, gender, and practice size. 
Results: Using 25,266,973 patient-year observations, we found that patients with more exposure 
to vertically integrated physicians exhibited significantly larger increases in coded severity (p < 
0.001). With each additional year of vertical integration, patient severity increased by 20.4 
percent (95% CI: 18.3 to 22.4, p < .001). These effects were non-linear: the longer that an 
integrated physician treated a patient, the larger the increase in coded severity. Instrumental 
variables analysis showed a significant effect as well (10.4 percent, 95% CI: 8.9 to 11.9, p < 
.001). 
Conclusion: Vertical integration facilitates higher coding intensity. The benefits of vertically 
integrated delivery systems should be weighed against the increased costs associated with higher 
reported patient severity. 
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Introduction 
 
Hospital ownership of physician practices and hospital employment of physicians has increased 
rapidly in the last decade.1–5 While the increased prevalence of these provider arrangements 
(often called vertical integration) likely has multiple causes, some have noted that delivery 
systems might bring together inpatient and outpatient services under common ownership in part 
to prepare for and better perform in alternative payment models.6–8 These models, such as 
accountable care organizations (ACO) and episode-based payment initiatives, carry incentives 
for systems to reduce costs while improving quality. The payments from these models are 
adjusted for the risk of the patient population. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS), for example, uses patient demographic information and the diagnosis codes found in 
Medicare administrative claims data to calculate a patient risk score that they use in establishing 
benchmarks for the Medicare Shared Savings Program ACO. Correspondingly, hospitals and 
physicians have an incentive to maximize the coded severity of the patients in their care as 
documented in diagnoses. Moreover, these alternative payment incentives overlay an existing 
incentive structure that rewards providers for maximizing the reported severity of their patients. 
Payment rates for Medicare Severity Diagnosis Related Groups (MS-DRGs) increase with 
patient severity. In 2017, Medicare reimbursed a coronary bypass without major complication 
and comorbidity (MCC) at an average rate of $23,406; if the procedure was coded with MCC, 
the rate rose to $34,825.9 Vertical integration could help hospitals and physicians more 
comprehensively code the severity of their patients. Hospital systems may have full-time 
professional medical coders, software tools, consultants, and other services that they can share 
with acquired physician practices to assist in documenting all available conditions. Hospitals 
have much at stake: 60-80 percent of payment for inpatient surgery episodes accrues to the 
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hospital.10 Hospitals depend on the cooperation of physicians to document patient severity, and 
integration may help increase that cooperation.  
Despite these incentives and the increasing prevalence of hospital-physician vertical integration, 
the effects of integration on coded patient severity are unknown. In this study, we used national 
Medicare claims data over a six-year window to evaluate whether patients treated by vertically 
integrated physicians exhibited larger increases in their coded severity. We attributed patients to 
physicians and measured whether their physicians were vertically integrated with a hospital. We 
compared changes in coded severity among patients affiliated with integrated physicians to those 
that were not, using both a difference-in-differences model with patient-level fixed effects and 
instrumental variables analysis to estimate the effects. Our findings provide policymakers with 
insights about the role of vertical integration in coded severity and the rising cost of care. 
Methods 
 
Data and Sample 
 
We created our sample using national claims from 2010-2015. We linked several data sources: 
Medicare fee-for-service Carrier line items from 2010-2015, Medicare Data on Provider Practice 
and Specialty (MD-PPAS), the Medicare Master Beneficiary Summary file, the American 
Community Survey, and the Area Health Resources File.  
We applied several inclusion criteria to arrive at our analytical sample (see Appendix 1). We 
selected patients with Medicare Part A and Part B coverage who were not enrolled in Medicare 
Advantage, were alive through the duration of the study period, and had our outcomes and 
covariates populated in the data sources. We excluded patients whom we could not attribute to a 
primary care physician or for whom attributed physician covariates were missing. Lastly, we 
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selected patients who were enrolled in Medicare fee-for-service for at least two years of our six-
year window to ensure that our findings applied to a reasonably representative sample of patients 
(i.e., requiring a full six years of continuous enrollment – or conversely, only one year – could 
introduce sample bias toward the sickest or healthiest patients). 
Key Variables 
 
With the information available in the data sources above, we measured each patient’s age, sex 
and race. We attributed each patient to the primary care physician from whom he or she received 
the plurality of his or her care that year. We also measured area and market characteristics for 
each beneficiary. Following the covariate approach in related work by Markovitz and colleagues, 
we measured the county-level rates of high school completion, four-year college completion, and 
the market penetration of Medicare Advantage plans.11 In addition, we measured the hospital 
referral region Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, a measure of market competition, for hospitals and 
for primary care physicians. Finally, we measured several physician-level characteristics, 
including physician age, sex, and whether they resided in a rural area. We calculated the size of 
the practice in which each physician operated by counting the number of unique NPIs that billed 
under each TIN. 
We calculated whether a physician was vertically integrated with a hospital each year using a 
claims-based method established in the literature.12 For each physician, we measured the 
percentage of claims that they billed under Medicare’s office place of service codes and hospital 
outpatient department (HOPD) place of service. When at least 75 percent of these claims were 
billed under the HOPD code, we classified the physician as integrated; we varied this threshold 
and our results did not substantially change. To capture additional integrated physicians that the 
claims-based measure may have missed, we supplemented our measure by classifying physicians 
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as integrated if their primary employer was likely a hospital system using a variety of keywords, 
including “hospital,” “medical center,” and “health system” (see Appendix 2 for details).  
We calculated our exposure variable in several ways. First, we calculated for each patient the 
cumulative number of years in which they were attributed to a vertically integrated physician. 
For example, a patient whose attributed physician was not integrated in 2010 or 2011, but whose 
attributed physician in 2012-2015 was integrated, would have exposure scores for years 2010 
through 2015 of 0,0,1,2,3,4, respectively. With this cumulative measure, we accounted for the 
fact that physicians entered into vertically integrated arrangements at different times throughout 
our study period; we also accounted for possible effects of being treated within a vertically 
integrated system over long periods of time. Estimation using this definition appears in Figure 
3.2 (Models 1 and 2). We also calculated exposure with dummy variables for patients who had 
one year, two years, and three or more years of being attributed to a vertically integrated 
physician. Lastly, we also use the simple measure of whether a patient’s attributed physician in 
each year was vertically integrated. In all specifications, we control for calendar year. 
Our outcome was the HCC score of each patient in each year. This score, which we calculated in 
accordance with CMS specifications, measures the spending risk of the patient, reflecting clinical 
diagnoses and socioeconomic health predictors, with a population mean set to 1.00. Patients with 
higher risk scores have higher predicted spending. 
Analysis 
 
We estimated the effect of integration on coded severity using three approaches.  
First, we used a flexible linear regression model with patient-level fixed effects, controls for area 
characteristics, and controls for physician characteristics. We applied the model to the full 
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analytical sample. We first used cumulative years of exposure to integration as the outcome 
variable (Model 1 of Figure 3.2); we also estimated a model in which we added a squared term 
of this variable (Model 2 of Figure 3.2). We also estimated the effect using the dummy variables 
described above (Model 3 of Figure 3.2). These measures allowed for a possible non-linear 
relationship between years of integration and changes in coded patient severity. Our 
identification relies on within-patient variation in integration status and changes in coded patient 
severity. Our strategy assumes that after including patient fixed effects and time-varying 
controls, there are no remaining time-variant omitted variables that affect both integration and 
changes in coded severity. 
Second, we conducted a difference-in-differences (DD) analysis in which we tested several 
different constructions of the comparison group. In our preferred specification, we used inverse 
probability weighting (IPW) to construct the comparison group from all available patients. IPW 
can reduce the bias in estimated treatment effects by weighting observations according to the 
inverse of the probability of receiving their actual treatment.13,14 In this analysis, the treated 
group is the set of patients who began unintegrated and permanently switched to integrated. We 
tested several other comparison groups by grouping patients into five different types of exposure 
– those whose attributed physicians were never integrated (Never), always integrated (Always), 
began unintegrated and permanently switched to integrated (Integrater), began integrated and 
permanently switched to unintegrated (Disintegrater), and those who switched back and forth 
(Switcher). One disadvantage of this approach is that it required some simplifying 
categorizations to create our exposure type subgroups; for example, any patient who switched 
back and forth between integration and non-integration was a “Switcher,” though there were 
different levels of exposure to integration within this group. The advantage of this grouped 
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analysis, however, was that it allowed us to track consistent groups of patients before and after 
integration or de-integration in a DD framework. In addition to our inverse probability weighting 
approach, we also estimated our model using the Never group and the Always group as 
comparisons; results for these can be found in Appendix 5. In our setting, no common start date 
exists: patients might receive treatment from an integrated physician in only 2010, only 2015, or 
no years at all. Therefore, we centered each patient’s start dates around t=0, where t=1 indicated 
the first year they were treated by an integrated physician. Among the groups with no start dates 
– the Never and Always groups – we assigned artificial start dates by randomizing each patient 
to a starting year. The probability of a patient being assigned to a starting year was based on the 
proportion of Integrater patients who began seeing treated physicians in each year. This approach 
allowed us to evaluate different groups of patients along a common time scale. Our identifying 
assumptions in this model are those of a difference-in-difference analysis. In the absence of 
treatment, we assumed the difference between treated and control groups would have remained 
constant from the pre-period through the post-period. We further assumed that the outcome trend 
did not influence selection into or out of integration, and that there were no shocks, other than 
the treatment, that differentially affected the treatment or control groups. 
Third, we developed an instrumental variables approach. We defined our instrument as the 
percentage of all local physicians who were integrated with hospitals in each year (using the 
geography of core-based statistical areas [CBSA]). Geographic instruments have been used in 
related applications to identify treatment effects: Sheetz and colleagues rely on regional 
utilization of laparoscopy as an instrument to evaluate the safety of laparaoscopic and open 
colectomy procedures in the presence of differences in skill among surgeons; Xian and 
colleagues use a differential distance measure to evaluate the mortality associated with stroke 
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centers; and Gaynor uses area-level instruments to account for the endogenous supply of 
physicians in an area.15–17 We found that our instrument exhibits considerable variation 
(Appendix 9). This variation effectively assigns nearby patients to higher or lower probabilities 
of being treated by an integrated physician. 
This approach is essential because patients in Medicare fee-for-service can select their own 
physicians. This freedom of choice raises the potential for self-selection bias in our context. The 
study designs of the foregoing approaches will control for any time-stable patient characteristics 
as well as many time-varying covariates. However, if patients self-select into treatment by 
integrated physicians due to unobserved time-varying changes in health trajectory – a reasonably 
likely possibility for some patients – then the estimates from the first two approaches may be 
upwardly biased. We would mistake the effect of a patient’s worsening health condition on 
coded severity for the effect of vertical integration on coded severity. Our instrumental variables 
analysis solves this problem by “randomizing” patients into the care of vertically integrated 
physicians via the proportion of local physicians that are integrated. Provided that patients do not 
move to localities because of a locality’s level of integrated physicians – which, based on 
Current Population Survey data below, we propose is a reasonable proviso – the estimates we 
recover from our instrumental variables analysis will be unbiased. 
We conducted a two-stage least squares regression. In the first stage, we estimated the strength 
of the relationship between our instrument (percent of CBSA physicians vertically integrated) 
and our endogenous variable (whether the patient was attributed to a vertically integrated 
physician that year). We generated predicted values for whether the patient was attributed to an 
integrated physician. In our second stage, we regressed our outcome variable (coded patient 
severity) on these predicted values. In both specifications, we included our covariates, including 
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patient fixed effects. We clustered our standard errors at the patient level. The effect that we 
identified using this instrument was a local average treatment effect (LATE) among the 
compliers – i.e., the effect among the patients whose attributed integration status (“treatment”) 
was determined by the instrument. 
Our instrumental variables analysis has two key assumptions: instrument relevance and the 
exclusion restriction. Our instrument must be a significant predictor of the endogenous variable 
to avoid the biases associated with weak instruments.18 This is testable. We show in our results 
that there is a correlation between the percent of physicians who are integrated and the 
probability of a patient being attributed to a vertically integrated physician. Weak instruments 
can cause instrumental variables estimates to be asymptotically biased.18 However, in our case, 
we do not anticipate that this is an issue: we found a very strong relationship between our 
instrument and the endogenous variable. Moreover, weak instrument bias can be mitigated if the 
instrument passes the second assumption, that is, the exclusion restriction: the instrument does 
not exert any effect on the outcome variable except through its relationship with the endogenous 
variable. While this is not testable, we argue that this instrument passes the exclusion restriction. 
We do not think that the percentage of local physicians that are integrated with a hospital system 
has an independent effect on patient’s coded severity. The most plausible violation would be if 
patients self-select into CBSAs that have higher or lower proportions of integrated physicians 
due to their expected changes in health status. Our approach controls for any time-stable health 
status with our patient fixed effects, however, if older adults move to CBSAs due to changes in 
health status, this would threaten the validity of the exclusion restriction.  
To measure this potential threat, we examined moving data from the Current Population Survey 
of the U.S. Census Bureau for the age group that most closely reflected our sample.19 We found 
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that adults in this age group were highly stationary. If they did move, they usually stayed within 
the same county. In 2019, there were approximately 23.4 million Americans between ages 70 
and 79. Among these, there were 868,000 moves (3.7 percent of the 70-79 population). Fewer 
than 1 in 6 of these moves were health-related, and 58 percent of moves were same-county 
changes in residence. Given these figures, we estimate that, on the high end, only about 0.3 
percent of the population moves counties due to health reasons. Fewer still are likely to move 
CBSAs (which are larger than counties). Finally, it is likely that many of these health-related 
moves reflect adults moving into long-term care facilities, in which case they do not bias our 
results, because our sample includes only community-based individuals. For these reasons, we 
think our instrument passes the exclusion restriction. 
Results 
Descriptive Results 
 
After applying our inclusion criteria, we generated an analytical sample of 25,266,973 patient-
years, representing 5,979,862 distinct patients (Table 3.1). Seventy-three percent of the patients 
in our sample received the plurality of their primary care from a non-integrated physician during 
the study period, while 27 percent received their care from an integrated physician in at least one 
year. Among those with at least one year of treatment from a vertically integrated physician, the 
average number of years exposed to vertically integrated physicians was 2.6 of 4.7 years. 
The patients treated by integrated physicians closely resembled the patients treated by non-
integrated physicians in demographics: patients were approximately 72 years of age in both 
groups; about 59 percent of the sample was female; and the racial distribution was very similar. 
They also appeared similar in area characteristics, such as the poverty rate, the percentage of the 
population that graduated from high school and college, and the Medicare Advantage penetration 
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in the county. Hospital markets were slightly more concentrated among patients treated by 
integrated physicians (HHI of 2100 compared to 1923), a pattern also shown in the market for 
primary care physicians (188 compared to 162). 
The non-integrated physician population was slightly older (53.4 years to 50.9 years), had fewer 
females (24 percent compared to 28 percent), and was less rural (23 percent compared to 33 
percent) than the integrated physician population. As expected, the size of the practices differed 
considerably. Non-integrated physicians had a median practice size of 6 providers, while 
integrated physicians had a median size of 48. 
Patients differed in their clinical profiles across integration exposure. Those treated by non-
integrated physicians were coded as having an average of 1.96 chronic conditions, while patients 
treated by integrated physicians had an average of 2.48 chronic conditions. Similarly, the HCC 
coded severity score was 1.11 among non-integrated physicians and 1.35 among those treated by 
integrated physicians. For both integrated and non-integrated patients, coded severity increased 
from 2010 to 2015, consistent with patients aging during this window. However, patients of 
integrated physicians exhibited a larger increase in coded severity: from 2010 to 2015, these 
patients showed an increase of 53 percent while the increase among non-integrated physicians 
increased 38 percent. The changes in integration severity were very similar between those who 
were always treated by integrated physicians and never treated by integrated physicians (Figure 
3.1).  
Statistical Results 
 
As described in our methods, we conducted our statistical analyses with three approaches.  
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We first specified a flexible linear model with patient-level fixed effects, controls for area 
characteristics, and controls for physician characteristics. The outcome variable was the HCC 
coded severity score. We began with the simple value of the exposure variable (cumulative years 
of exposure to vertically integrated physicians); then, to allow for a non-linear relationship 
between exposure to vertical integration and coded severity, we tested models with a quadratic 
term and dummy variables for 1, 2, and 3 or more years of attribution to a vertically integrated 
physician.  
In the first model, the marginal effect of one year of vertical integration was 3.24 percent (95% 
CI: 3.08 to 3.40), implying that for each additional year of treatment under a vertically integrated 
physician, patient clinical severity scores rose by 3.24 percent. By extension, over the course of 
six years, this implies that severity scores under an integrated physician would rise by 
approximately 21 percent (1.0324^6=1.21). In the next model, we included the cumulative years 
of vertical integration as well as its squared term. In this model, the marginal effect of another 
year of treatment under a vertically integrated physician more than tripled to 12.59 percent (95% 
CI: 11.27 to 13.91). This larger marginal effect suggests that coding changes accumulate over 
time, and that with a longer duration of treatment from a vertically integrated physician, there is 
more opportunity to identify codable diagnoses and conditions. Model 3 shows even larger 
effects. Among patients with one year or two years attributed to vertically integrated physicians, 
scores were 22 percent higher, after accounting for patient fixed effects and covariates. Among 
patients with three or more years, coded severity was 24 percent larger. 
In our second approach, we divided patients into groups by exposure type. Our outcome variable, 
patient HCC coded severity score, remained the same as in our first approach. For estimation, 
this approach required us to select a treatment group and a control group. The natural choice for 
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the treatment group was the Integrater group. These were patients who, during the study period, 
had initially been treated by a non-integrated physician, then became treated by an integrated 
physician and stayed with an integrated physician from that point forward. We think that this 
group captures an important subset of patients: those whose physicians sell their practices to 
hospitals, or those whose physicians leave an independent practice for a hospital-affiliated 
practice. This subset is relevant with respect to external validity. If we are interested in the 
effects on patient coded severity that might materialize in the future if a hospital acquires a 
practice, thereby converting its patients from being treated by non-integrated to integrated 
physicians, then this group most closely resembles that phenomenon. We constructed our 
preferred control group using inverse probability weighting. We also modeled this analysis using 
the “Never” and the “Always” integrated as the control groups (see Appendix 5). Our estimate of 
the effect of vertical integration came from the interaction of a patient being in the “Integrater” 
group with each of the post-periods.  
Figure 3.3 shows our results. We display the predicted values for the annual change in coded 
severity, adjusted for patient, area, and physician characteristics; the model also includes 
dummies for each time period to control for cohort effects (i.e. to control for the possibility that 
Integraters in 2012 may have had different experiences than Integraters in 2015) and each 
calendar year to control for secular trends (e.g. the population age and clinical severity rise over 
time, independent of integration exposure). Because we interact all time periods with all levels of 
the exposure variable, one of the time periods must be chosen as the baseline, such that the 
Integrater group and the control group will have the same adjusted value. We set this baseline 
time period to be the last pre-period (t = -1). 
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Year 1 is the first year in which a patient receives the plurality of his or her care from an 
integrated physician. Our attribution approach effectively makes Year 0 a partially treated year. 
Some patients in the Integrater group began seeing vertically integrated physicians prior to those 
physicians becoming their main attributed physician (i.e. prior to Year 1). A patient need not 
even change physicians for this to happen. For example, consider a patient with one outpatient 
visit per month whose physician joins a hospital system in September of 2012. This patient 
appears treated by a non-integrated physician for 2012 and treated by an integrated physician in 
2013, even though four months of 2012 were under the care of an integrated physician. Period 0, 
corresponding to 2012, is a partly-treated year. Consistent with this rationale, the effect size in 
Period 0 is positive but smaller than the effect in Period 1. 
One of the key assumptions behind this analysis was that the difference between the Integrater 
group and the control group would have remained constant from the pre-period through the post-
period in the absence of treatment. To justify this assumption, we examined whether the trends in 
changes in coded severity over the pre-period were parallel. A visual inspection of Figure 3.3 
suggested these groups were likely to meet the parallel trends requirement. We tested for leading 
effects: whether the treatment group differed at each point in the pre-period from the comparison 
group. We found evidence of very small differences between the groups that did not reach major 
significance levels (Appendix 4). The pre-period differences in times -4, -3, and -2 were 
associated with p-values of .04, .03, and .09. By contrast, the effects in the post-period were 
large and highly significant (p < .00001). We argue that, given the statistical power to detect 
differences in our sample size of over 25 million observations, we would need to observe 
significance levels of α < 0.01 to reject any null hypotheses. Moreover, when using the 
alternative control group of patients always attributed to integrated physicians, we found 
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evidence of parallel slopes; in that alternative specification, the treatment effects were 
comparable to those we found with our preferred approach (Appendix 3.6 and Appendix 3.7). 
We therefore conclude that there is good evidence for our core DD assumption. 
In our preferred DD specification (Figure 3.3), we found that the coded severity of the integrated 
group jumped sharply in the first full year of integration, after which severity increases continued 
to outpace the comparison group. While the graph for the comparison group trends upward at 
close to a constant slope from the first pre-period to the last post-period, the graph for the 
Integrater group changes markedly around the time of integration. In Year 0, coded severity 
increased by about 5 percent (Figure 3.3; see also Appendix 3.6). In Year 1, the first full year of 
integration, the effect size was 33 percent. Years 2-5 return to smaller effect sizes of between 20 
and 24 percent. The observation-weighted average effect over the entire post-period was 20 
percent. These effect sizes cohere with our first approach. There, we found effects ranging from 
about 12 percent to about 24 percent. Our estimates here land near the upper bound of that range.  
In our third approach, we used instrumental variables analysis to identify the effect (Figure 3.4). 
In our first two approaches, despite our use of patient fixed effects and time-varying covariates, 
there could be at least some residual selection of patients into integrated practices that we could 
not control. Our two-stage least squares instrumental variables approach attempted to remove 
any residual endogeneity between trend in coded severity and integration. 
The first-stage results display the estimated coefficient of the instrument (percent of physicians 
in the CBSA who were vertically integrated) on each patient’s current-year attribution to a 
vertically integrated physician (0.462, 95% CI: 0.458 to 0.465). We rejected the two-sided null 
hypothesis that the coefficient on our instrument was not different from 0 (t = 253, p < .0001), 
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indicating that the instrument was highly predictive of attribution to a vertically integrated 
physician (Figure 3.4 and Appendix 3.10). 
We regressed our instrument, exogenous covariates, patient fixed effects, and calendar year on 
the endogenous variable (current-year attribution to a vertically integrated physician) and 
generated predicted values of current-year attribution to a vertically integrated physician. We 
used these predicted values in our second-stage estimation (Figure 3.4). The coefficient (0.122, 
95% CI: 0.109 to 0.135) on the predicted value represents the local average treatment effect 
(LATE). Among the patients who were induced to attribution to an integrated physician by the 
instrument, i.e., among the compliers, our estimates indicated that a year of integration was 
associated with an increase in coded severity of 0.122; given an unadjusted sample mean of 1.17, 
this reflects an increase of 10.4 percent. This IV estimate is in the same direction and about one-
half the magnitude of the estimates we generated in our previous approaches. 
We tested numerous subsamples, measures, and specifications in our statistical approaches 
(Appendix 3.3, Appendix 3.4, Appendix 3.5, Appendix 3.6, Appendix 3.7, Appendix 3.8, 
Appendix 3.9). Our results were qualitatively robust to these sensitivity analyses. 
Discussion 
 
In this study, patients’ coded severity increased by 38-53 percent from 2010 to 2015. We found 
that treatment by a vertically integrated physician was associated with at least 10 percent higher 
coded patient severity after accounting for other patient-level characteristics, with some 
specifications showing effects of up to 24 percent. .These findings imply that the increasing 
prevalence of hospital-physician integration could substantially raise patients’ reported clinical 
severity and, correspondingly, raise costs to Medicare. 
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Researchers have debated whether alternative payment models induce integration. Some have 
concluded that Medicare’s ACO program has little to do with provider consolidation20; along 
similar lines, others found that payment reforms pertaining to drug reimbursement did not 
contribute to vertical integration among oncologists.21 By contrast, recent work found an 
association between integration and participation in alternative payment models such as ACOs 
and comprehensive primary care.22 Our research does not address whether alternative payment 
causes vertical integration. It does suggest that by extending coding-maximization protocols to 
physician practices, integration may help provider systems reach reimbursement goals within 
alternative payment models. 
Related work on provider organizations and coded patient severity has examined the context of 
Medicare’s Shared Savings Program (MSSP).11 Researchers found that although participation in 
these Accountable Care Organizations was not associated with changes in coded severity 
(plausibly because the program does not upwardly adjust reimbursement with increases in patient 
risk scores), providers were more likely to drop high-risk patients. Our study adds a new result to 
the literature: that ownership of physician practices matters for the coding of patient illness. Our 
results show, through multiple specifications, that hospital ownership of physician practices is 
strongly related to coded patient severity. 
Our study has several limitations. The most plausible alternative explanation for our findings is 
that patients selected into treatment from an integrated physician in a time-varying way. This is 
reasonable: as patients become sicker, they may be referred to physicians affiliated with a larger 
medical system. They may also prefer to receive care from integrated settings. The estimates 
from the instrumental variables analysis, which attempted to address this time-varying selection, 
are somewhat smaller than results from the other approaches. This suggests the possibility of 
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bias from time-varying selection in the other approaches. Nonetheless, all specifications suggest 
that the effects on coded severity are still statistically significant and economically important, 
representing a double-digit increase in coded severity. A further limitation is that we rely on 
Medicare’s administrative claims data, which creates two issues. First, we cannot infer the 
effects of integration on coded severity among the commercially-insured population. While we 
cannot comment on whether these coding increases would appear among commercially-insured 
patients, we suspect that if hospitals extend their coding resources to acquired practices, they 
likely do so for all patients treated by the practice, suggesting that higher coded severity and 
higher costs may rise among other patient populations. Second, we cannot observe actual health 
conditions in our data. It is possible that some or all of the increases in coded severity reflect true 
changes in the underlying health status of patients, and that hospital systems have done a better 
job of identifying these changes. Finally, we make simplifying assumptions in order to attribute 
patients to physicians, and thereby to attribute patients’ exposure to vertical integration. We 
think, though, that a primary care physician who provides the plurality of a patient’s care can be 
reasonably characterized as that patient’s main physician for purposes of exposure to vertically 
integrated systems. To the extent that patients attributed to integrated physicians may have also 
been treated by some non-integrated physicians, our results are biased toward the null. 
The proliferation of hospital-driven integrated delivery systems will likely contribute to increases 
in Medicare spending through maximizing the reported illness of patients. Although careful 
documentation of patient disease burden is essential to providing appropriate care and 
appropriate reimbursement, incorrect coding occurs frequently. A report by the Department of 
Health and Human Services’s Office of Inspector General found increases in the billing of 
higher-complexity (higher-reimbursement) evaluation and management (E/M) codes from 2001 
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to 2010. The OIG discovered that 42 percent of E/M codes were incorrectly coded, and that E/M 
services billed at inappropriately high levels (i.e. “upcoded” E/M visits) accounted for $4.6 
billion in Medicare payments in 2010.23 Similarly, CMS has identified sizable payments 
attributable to improper claims, amounting to over $28 billion in 2019.24 Some doubt that the 
coding increases reflect actual changes in underlying patient condition. In Massachusetts, for 
example, the state’s Health Policy Commission found widespread evidence of increased coded 
severity from 2013-2018. Low-acuity discharges decreased while high-acuity discharges 
increased. Commercial inpatient spending rose more than 10 percent even though inpatient 
volume declined by over 12 percent. From 2013 to 2017, patients’ coded severity rose by 11.3 
percent, equivalent to “an additional 428,000 commercially insured Massachusetts residents with 
complex diabetes or 920,000 with cerebral palsy.”25 The report suggests that coding practices, 
not patient health, drove heightened patient severity scores. A sizable industry has emerged to 
support provider systems in their efforts to maximize reimbursement. The American Academy of 
Professional Coders, for example, offers 28 certifications, including “professional service 
coding,” “professional billing,” and “clinical documentation.” Hospitals often employ full-time 
medical coders, and virtually all hospitals use electronic medical records. A wide variety of 
proprietary medical coding software applications plug into EHRs to allow providers to 
automatically identify the highest appropriate reimbursement for their services. Given these 
operational factors, in conjunction with hospital incentives in risk-based contracts, it is not 
surprising that patients whose physicians join hospital systems exhibit increases in coded 
severity. These increases most immediately affect payers, including Medicare, Medicaid, and 
commercial payers, who should work with physicians in their networks, particularly those 
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affiliated with hospitals, to ensure that changes in patient coding reflect medical necessity and 
appropriateness. 
Our findings add important insight into the relationship between provider ownership, 
reimbursement incentives, and billing behavior. While we anticipate that the higher costs 
associated with higher coded severity will eventually be passed onto patients, the effects of such 
coding practices on patient care quality is unclear, which we think is a subject for future 
research. As integrated delivery systems expand, and with them an increase in coded severity, 
state and federal policymakers tasked with constraining health care spending may need to rethink 
the role of provider-reported acuity in the reimbursement paradigm. 
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Chapter 3 Exhibits 
 
 Table 3.1. Sample Characteristics 
 
 
Characteristics 
No 
Integrated 
Years 
At Least 1 
Integrated 
Year 
Patient Characteristics    
 Number of Patients 4,383,071 1,596,791 
 Number of Patient-Years 18,667,858 6,599,115 
    
 Age 72.6 71.5 
 Female (%) 59 59 
    
 White 86 84 
 Black 9 10 
 Hispanic 2 2 
 Other 4 4 
    
 Years in Sample from 2010-2016 4.8 4.7 
 Years with Vertically Integrated 
Physician 0 2.6 
    
 Count of conditions 1.96 2.48 
 Severity Score 1.11 1.35 
 Average Change in Severity 2010-2015 0.38 0.53 
 Average Annual Change in Severity 0.1 0.15 
Area Characteristics    
 Poverty 13.6 14.6 
 High School 86.7 86.6 
 College 28.9 26.6 
 HHI Hospital (HRR) 1923 2100 
 HHI Specialty (HRR) 162 188 
 Medicare Advantage (%) 24.8 24.1 
Primary Care 
Physician 
Characteristics    
 Physician Age 53.4 50.9 
 Physician Female (%) 24 28 
 Rural (%) 23 33 
 Size of Practice (median number of 
providers) 6 48 
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Figure 3.1. Changes in Patient Coded Severity Over Study Period by Patient Exposure to 
Integration 
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Figure 3.2. Average Marginal Effects on Coded Patient Severity of Treatment from a Vertically 
Integrated Physician, with 95% Confidence Intervals, by Model Specification 
 
Notes: All models adjusted for covariates, calendar year, and patient fixed effects. The 
independent variable in Model 1 is the cumulative number of years with a vertically integrated 
physician (VI). Model 2 adds a term for VI2. Model 3 uses three dummy variables. 
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Figure 3.3. Patient Coded Severity Before and After Exposure to Vertically Integrated Physician 
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Figure 3.4. Instrumental Variables Estimates of Effect of Vertical Integration on Coded Severity 
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Chapter 3 Appendix 
 
Appendix 3.1. Sample Flow Diagram 
 
Inclusion Criterion Remaining Sample Size 
Patient-Years 2010-2015 33,947,163 
No Medicare Advantage 32,280,538 
Part A and Part B 30,723,879 
Alive During 2010-2015 30,723,756 
Have HCC Score 30,640,142 
Have Covariates 28,351,264 
Have Primary Care Physician 28,351,264 
Physician Variables Present 26,890,971 
At least two years of enrollment 25,266,972 
Final sample size 25,266,972 
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Appendix 3.2. Measuring Vertical Integration 
 
We defined integration using a strategy developed by Neprash and colleagues. They utilize the 
place of service codes found in Medicare claims. During our study period, when a hospital 
acquired a physician, the physician became eligible to bill under the Hospital Outpatient 
Department (HOPD) place of service code. The incentives to make this billing change were 
strong, since reimbursement under an HOPD designation was often higher than under an office 
designation. We created an indicator for each physician in each year to indicate integration status 
by counting the number of line items billed in the Medicare Carrier (physician/supplier) claims 
under an office code and under an HOPD code. When 75 percent or more of these line items 
were billed under an HOPD code, we classified the physician as integrated. In addition to the 
Carrier claims, Neprash and colleagues also used the Outpatient claims to reclassify some Carrier 
claims that were likely miscategorized as having taken place in the office setting. We do not take 
this additional step because the number of reclassified claims was small (2-3%). Their eMethods 
(2015) contains a clear explanation of the details in their approach. In addition, we use MD-
PPAS data to supplement the claims-based approach. If a physician’s tax identifier legal name 
contains the keywords “medical center,” “hospital,” “system,” “health science center,” “health 
sciences center,” or “med ctr,” we identify them as integrated. 
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Appendix 3.3. Marginal effects of vertical integration 
 
Sample: 2 or 
more years 
(preferred) Marginal Effect 
95% CI Lower 
Limit 
95% CI Upper 
Limit P Value 
VI Years 
Cumulative (VI) 0.0427 0.0419 0.0435 <.0001 
VI Squared 0.1538 0.1520 0.1556 <.0001 
1 year 0.2743 0.2714 0.2771 <.0001 
2 years 0.2813 0.2780 0.2847 <.0001 
3 or more years 0.2916 0.2879 0.2952 <.0001 
     
Restricted 
Sample: 6 years Marginal Effect 
95% CI Lower 
Limit 
95% CI Upper 
Limit P Value 
VI Years 
Cumulative (VI) 0.0239 0.0230 0.0249 <.0001 
VI Squared 0.1062 0.1038 0.1086 <.0001 
1 year 0.2278 0.2237 0.2319 <.0001 
2 years 0.199 0.1942 0.2037 <.0001 
3 or more years 0.2162 0.2113 0.2210 <.0001 
Notes: All models adjusted for covariates, calendar year, and patient fixed effects. Restricted 
sample includes one observation per patient per year (fully balanced). The results presented in 
the manuscript are from the sample requiring 2 or more years. 
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Appendix 3.4. Regression specifications for DD analysis with and without IPW 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES DD IPW DD no IPW 
 [Preferred]  
   
Patient Coded Severity (outcome)   
   
Treated group  - - 
   
Time = -4 -0.256*** -0.260*** 
 (0) (0) 
Time = -3 -0.170*** -0.173*** 
 (0) (0) 
Time = -2 -0.0841*** -0.0870*** 
 (0) (0) 
Time = -1 (base)   
   
Time = 0 0.0939*** 0.0919*** 
 (0) (0) 
Time = 1 0.195*** 0.197*** 
 (0) (0) 
Time = 2 0.271*** 0.272*** 
 (0) (0) 
Time = 3 0.354*** 0.356*** 
 (0) (0) 
Time = 4 0.444*** 0.444*** 
 (0) (0) 
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Time = 5 0.526*** 0.530*** 
 (0) (0) 
Leading Effects   
   
Treated group # time -4 -0.0225** -0.0166*** 
 (0.0432) (4.08e-06) 
Treated group # time -3 -0.0247** -0.0174*** 
 (0.0313) (3.13e-10) 
Treated group # time -2 -0.0356* -0.0155*** 
 (0.0953) (0) 
Treated group # time -1 0 0 
   
Lagged Effects   
   
Treated group # time 0 0.0494*** 0.0562*** 
 (2.10e-05) (0) 
Treated group # time 1 0.326*** 0.332*** 
 (0) (0) 
Treated group # time 2 0.222*** 0.228*** 
 (0) (0) 
Treated group # time 3 0.202*** 0.212*** 
 (0) (0) 
Treated group # time 4 0.217*** 0.227*** 
 (0) (0) 
Treated group # time 5 0.237*** 0.241*** 
 (0) (0) 
Medicare Advantage penetration 0.000576*** 0.000686*** 
 (0.000636) (0) 
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High School 0.000808** 0.000708*** 
 (0.0302) (1.68e-09) 
College -0.000116 0.000144** 
 (0.563) (0.0367) 
Poverty -0.000427* -0.000337*** 
 (0.0867) (0.000115) 
HHI Hospital (ln) -0.0181*** -0.0199*** 
 (0) (0) 
HHI PCP (ln) 0.00855*** 0.00987*** 
 (0) (0) 
Size of Practice -4.02e-05*** -5.17e-05*** 
 (6.45e-08) (0) 
Physician Age -0.00330*** -0.00386*** 
 (0) (0) 
Physician Female -0.0351*** -0.0368*** 
 (0) (0) 
Rural -0.0664*** -0.0677*** 
 (0) (0) 
2011.year 0.00189** 0.00212*** 
 (0.0188) (1.91e-05) 
2012.year -0.0115*** -0.0117*** 
 (0) (0) 
2013.year -0.0189*** -0.0203*** 
 (0) (0) 
2014.year -0.0274*** -0.0320*** 
 (0) (0) 
2015.year (omitted) - - 
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Constant 1.244*** 1.287*** 
 (0) (0) 
   
Observations 25,240,600 25,240,600 
R-squared 0.716 0.706 
Notes: DD – difference in differences; IPW – inverse probability weighting; PCP – primary care 
physician. 
Coefficient estimates shown with p-values in parentheses below. Leading effects show the 
difference between the treatment and comparison groups in the pre-period for each time period; 
lagged effects show these differences in the post-period. 
Model (1) gives the preferred specification, results from which appear in the manuscript. Model 
(1), using IPW, shows pre-period differences between treatment and control groups that are less 
statistically significant (no leading effects reach significance levels of .01), indicative of trends 
that are more parallel. Model (2), not using IPW, shows more significant differences in the pre-
period (all leading effects from Model (2) are significant at p < .001).  
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Appendix 3.5. Patient Coded Severity Before and After Integration without IPW 
 
Notes: IPW – inverse probability weighting 
This specification does not use IPW; aside from that, the specification is the same as that shown 
in Figure 3.3 of the manuscript. The effects estimated here (average effect = 0.21) are similar in 
magnitude to those from Figure 3.3 (average effect = 0.204). 
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Appendix 3.6. Regression specifications for DD analysis with alternative comparison groups and 
sample inclusion criteria 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES DD IPW 
[Preferred] 
DD with 
Always 
DD with 
Never 
DD using 6 
year sample 
     
Patient Coded Severity 
(outcome) 
    
     
Treated group  - - - - 
     
Time = -4 -0.256*** -0.320*** -0.262***  
 (0) (0) (0)  
Time = -3 -0.170*** -0.210*** -0.174*** -0.168*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Time = -2 -0.0841*** -0.107*** -0.0863*** -0.0839*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Time = -1 (base)     
     
Time = 0 0.0939*** 0.0999*** 0.0851*** 0.0814*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Time = 1 0.195*** 0.202*** 0.171*** 0.162*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Time = 2 0.271*** 0.303*** 0.256*** 0.247*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Time = 3 0.354*** 0.403*** 0.341*** 0.327*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
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Time = 4 0.444*** 0.497*** 0.425*** 0.408*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Time = 5 0.526*** 0.586*** 0.506*** 0.493*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Leading Effects     
     
Treated group # time -4 -0.0225** 0.0109** -0.0135***  
 (0.0432) (0.0488) (0.000203)  
Treated group # time -3 -0.0247** -0.000219 -0.0171*** -0.0792*** 
 (0.0313) (0.957) (8.74e-10) (0) 
Treated group # time -2 -0.0356* -0.00422 -0.0168*** -0.0377*** 
 (0.0953) (0.191) (0) (0) 
Treated group # time -1 0 0 0 0 
     
Lagged Effects     
     
Treated group # time 0 0.0494*** 0.0548*** 0.0638*** 0.0642*** 
 (2.10e-05) (0) (0) (0) 
Treated group # time 1 0.326*** 0.323*** 0.364*** 0.236*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Treated group # time 2 0.222*** 0.204*** 0.249*** 0.185*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Treated group # time 3 0.202*** 0.178*** 0.234*** 0.193*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Treated group # time 4 0.217*** 0.188*** 0.251*** 0.215*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Treated group # time 5 0.237*** 0.185*** 0.271*** 0.233*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
  
122 
 
Medicare Advantage 
penetration 
0.000576*** -0.000444** 0.000601*** 0.000603*** 
 (0.000636) (0.0162) (0) (7.83e-07) 
High School 0.000808** 0.000717** 0.000642*** 0.000606*** 
 (0.0302) (0.0292) (4.16e-07) (0.00228) 
College -0.000116 9.99e-05 0.000208*** 0.000130 
 (0.563) (0.610) (0.00539) (0.309) 
Poverty -0.000427* -2.37e-05 -0.000186* -0.000271* 
 (0.0867) (0.919) (0.0508) (0.0634) 
HHI Hospital (ln) -0.0181*** -0.0461*** -0.0166*** -0.0157*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
HHI PCP (ln) 0.00855*** 0.0224*** 0.00681*** 0.00573*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Size of Practice -4.02e-05*** -7.19e-05*** -6.35e-05*** -5.84e-05*** 
 (6.45e-08) (0) (0) (0) 
Physician Age -0.00330*** -0.00642*** -0.00285*** -0.00195*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Physician Female -0.0351*** -0.0431*** -0.0326*** -0.0249*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Rural -0.0664*** -0.113*** -0.0598*** -0.0461*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
2011.year 0.00189** -0.0138*** 0.00389***  
 (0.0188) (0) (0)  
2012.year -0.0115*** -0.0378*** -0.00960*** -0.0340*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
2013.year -0.0189*** -0.0516*** -0.0201*** -0.0519*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
2014.year -0.0274*** -0.0662*** -0.0329*** -0.0596*** 
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 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
2015.year (omitted) - - - - 
     
Constant 1.244*** 1.709*** 1.200*** 1.125*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
     
Observations 25,240,600 3,805,696 20,629,555 8,024,805 
R-squared 0.716 0.711 0.705 0.682 
 
Notes: DD – difference in differences; IPW – inverse probability weighting; PCP – primary care 
physician. 
Coefficient estimates shown with p-values in parentheses below. Leading effects show the 
difference between the treatment and comparison groups in the pre-period for each time period; 
lagged effects show these differences in the post-period. 
Model (1) gives the preferred specification, results from which appear in the manuscript. Model 
(2) uses the comparison group of patients who were always treated by an integrated physician 
rather than a comparison group selected through IPW. Model (3) uses the comparison group of 
patients who were never treated by an integrated physician. Model (4) replicates Model (3) using 
a subsample – to be included in Model (4), patients were required to appear in the data for all six 
years of observation, i.e., we enforced a continuous enrollment criterion. While the lagged 
effects of Model (4) are surprisingly similar to our preferred specification, Model (4)’s leading 
effect strongly suggest a violation of the parallel trends assumption (see also Panel 3 of 
Appendix 3.7). 
 
  
  
124 
 
Appendix 3.7. Patient Coded Severity Before and After Integration with alternative comparison 
groups and sample inclusion criteria 
 
Panel 1. Comparison group: Always treated by vertically integrated physician (Model (2)) 
 
Panel 2. Comparison group: Never treated by vertically integrated physician (Model (3)) 
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Panel 3. Continuously enrolled patients (strongly balanced panel) (Model (4))  
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Appendix 3.8. Regression specifications for DD analysis among single-doctor patients 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES DD IPW Single-doctor 
IPW 
Single-doctor 
with Never 
Single-doctor 
with Always 
     
Patient Coded Severity 
(outcome) 
    
     
Treated group  - - - - 
     
Time = -4 -0.256*** -0.229*** -0.235*** -0.244*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Time = -3 -0.170*** -0.154*** -0.159*** -0.161*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Time = -2 -0.0841*** -0.0716*** -0.0784*** -0.0785*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Time = -1 (base)     
     
Time = 0 0.0939*** 0.0752*** 0.0764*** 0.0805*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Time = 1 0.195*** 0.152*** 0.154*** 0.161*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Time = 2 0.271*** 0.230*** 0.234*** 0.240*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Time = 3 0.354*** 0.308*** 0.312*** 0.319*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Time = 4 0.444*** 0.390*** 0.391*** 0.397*** 
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 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Time = 5 0.526*** 0.467*** 0.470*** 0.473*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Leading Effects     
     
Treated group # time -4 -0.0225** 0.0810*** 0.0787*** 0.0791*** 
 (0.0432) (0) (0) (0) 
Treated group # time -3 -0.0247** 0.0425*** 0.0396*** 0.0369*** 
 (0.0313) (8.85e-10) (0) (1.20e-08) 
Treated group # time -2 -0.0356* 0.0144 0.0124*** 0.0107** 
 (0.0953) (0.172) (0.00288) (0.0338) 
Treated group # time -1 0 0 0 0 
     
Lagged Effects     
     
Treated group # time 0 0.0494*** -0.00218 -0.00519 -0.00716 
 (2.10e-05) (0.702) (0.151) (0.100) 
Treated group # time 1 0.326*** 0.0225*** 0.0180*** 0.0158*** 
 (0) (0.000821) (5.93e-06) (0.00106) 
Treated group # time 2 0.222*** 0.0311*** 0.0237*** 0.0239*** 
 (0) (3.22e-05) (6.41e-07) (2.57e-05) 
Treated group # time 3 0.202*** 0.0224*** 0.0175*** 0.0187*** 
 (0) (0.00858) (0.00221) (0.00547) 
Treated group # time 4 0.217*** 0.0282*** 0.0203*** 0.0235*** 
 (0) (0.00793) (0.00585) (0.00546) 
Treated group # time 5 0.237*** 0.0235 0.0136 0.0173 
 (0) (0.104) (0.183) (0.131) 
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Medicare Advantage 
penetration 
0.000576*** 0.000801** 0.000565*** -0.000239 
 (0.000636) (0.0359) (5.34e-07) (0.425) 
High School 0.000808** 0.000444 0.000679*** 0.000176 
 (0.0302) (0.588) (0.000101) (0.717) 
College -0.000116 -0.000559 0.000127 0.000164 
 (0.563) (0.439) (0.268) (0.611) 
Poverty -0.000427* -0.000476 -0.000180 -0.000152 
 (0.0867) (0.341) (0.160) (0.643) 
HHI Hospital (ln) -0.0181*** -0.00337 -0.00101 0.00892 
 (0) (0.497) (0.667) (0.106) 
HHI PCP (ln) 0.00855*** 0.00283 0.000627 -7.49e-05 
 (0) (0.334) (0.506) (0.978) 
Size of Practice -4.02e-05*** -3.93e-05* -2.34e-05*** -3.24e-05*** 
 (6.45e-08) (0.0722) (0) (8.97e-07) 
Physician Age -0.00330***    
 (0)    
Physician Female -0.0351***    
 (0)    
Rural -0.0664*** -0.0126*** -0.00990** 0.00454 
 (0) (0.00665) (0.0188) (0.584) 
2011.year 0.00189** 0.00885*** 0.00782*** 0.00273 
 (0.0188) (1.86e-10) (0) (0.162) 
2012.year -0.0115*** 0.00341 -0.00217*** -0.00847*** 
 (0) (0.290) (0.00446) (6.39e-05) 
2013.year -0.0189*** -0.00812** -0.0127*** -0.0175*** 
 (0) (0.0361) (0) (0) 
2014.year -0.0274*** -0.0173*** -0.0259*** -0.0349*** 
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 (0) (0.00313) (0) (0) 
2015.year (omitted) - - - - 
     
Constant 1.244*** 0.934*** 0.896*** 0.869*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
     
Observations 25,240,600 11,354,418 10,230,966 1,263,278 
R-squared 0.716 0.725 0.720 0.732 
 
Notes: DD – difference in differences; IPW – inverse probability weighting; PCP – primary care 
physician. 
Coefficient estimates shown with p-values in parentheses below. Leading effects show the 
difference between the treatment and comparison groups in the pre-period for each time period; 
lagged effects show these differences in the post-period. 
Model (1) gives the preferred specification, results from which appear in the manuscript. Model 
(2) replicates Model (1) using the subsample of patients whose attributed physician is the same 
for all periods in which the patient appears in the data. Approximately 44 percent of patients in 
our sample match this description. Model (3) replicates Model (2) using the comparison group of 
patients who were never treated by an integrated physician. Model (4) replicates Model (2) using 
the comparison group of patients who were always treated by an integrated physician. 
 
  
  
130 
 
Appendix 3.9. Patient Coded Severity Before and After Integration Among Single-Physician 
Patients 
 
Panel 1. Single-Physician Patients using IPW to select comparison group (Model (2))
 
Panel 2. Comparison group: Never attributed to vertically integrated physician (Model (3)) 
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Panel 3. Comparison group: Always attributed to vertically integrated physician (Model (4)) 
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Appendix 3.10. Instrumental Variables Estimation 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES First Stage Second Stage 
Patient Coded Severity 
(outcome) 
  
   
VI_hat (predicted 
value of endogenous 
variable) 
 0.122*** 
  (0) 
  0.109 - 0.135 
VI (endogenous)   
   
 -  
VI in CBSA 
(instrument) 
0.462***  
 (0)  
 0.458 - 0.465  
Medicare Advantage 
penetration 
-3.89e-05 0.000798*** 
 (0.150) (0) 
 -9.19e-05 - 1.41e-05 0.000667 - 0.000929 
High School -5.30e-05 0.000770*** 
 (0.209) (6.30e-11) 
 -0.000136 - 2.97e-05 0.000539 - 0.00100 
College -0.000179*** 0.000117* 
 (0) (0.0908) 
 -0.000230 - -0.000128 -1.86e-05 - 0.000253 
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Poverty -2.57e-05 -0.000401*** 
 (0.421) (4.51e-06) 
 -8.82e-05 - 3.69e-05 -0.000573 - -0.000230 
HHI Hospital (ln) 0.00530*** -0.0200*** 
 (0) (0) 
 0.00431 - 0.00628 -0.0220 - -0.0180 
HHI PCP (ln) 0.00396*** 0.0105*** 
 (0) (0) 
 0.00357 - 0.00435 0.00964 - 0.0113 
Size of Practice 0.000200*** -4.84e-05*** 
 (0) (0) 
 0.000198 - 0.000202 -5.25e-05 - -4.42e-05 
Physician Age -0.00400*** -0.00400*** 
 (0) (0) 
 -0.00403 - -0.00397 -0.00409 - -0.00391 
Physician Female 0.00119*** -0.0375*** 
 (0.00341) (0) 
 0.000395 - 0.00199 -0.0392 - -0.0358 
Rural 0.0393*** -0.0699*** 
 (0) (0) 
 0.0374 - 0.0411 -0.0733 - -0.0665 
year = 2011 0.0228*** 0.0992*** 
 (0) (0) 
 0.0225 - 0.0231 0.0982 - 0.100 
year = 2012 0.0276*** 0.177*** 
 (0) (0) 
 0.0272 - 0.0280 0.176 - 0.178 
year = 2013 0.0337*** 0.260*** 
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 (0) (0) 
 0.0332 - 0.0341 0.259 - 0.262 
year = 2014 0.0352*** 0.342*** 
 (0) (0) 
 0.0347 - 0.0357 0.340 - 0.343 
year = 2015 0.0400*** 0.466*** 
 (0) (0) 
 0.0394 - 0.0406 0.464 - 0.468 
   
   
  - 
Constant 0.190*** 1.191*** 
 (0) (0) 
 0.181 - 0.200 1.167 - 1.216 
   
Observations 25,240,211 25,240,211 
R-squared 0.726 0.705 
Notes: CBSA – Core-Based Statistical Area, HHI – Herfindahl Hirschman Index, PCP – primary 
care physician, VI – patient attribution to vertically integration physician in that year 
Coefficient estimates shown with p-values and 95% confidence intervals below. In the first 
stage, the dependent variable is VI and the regressor of interest is VI in CBSA. In the second 
stage, the dependent variable is patient coded severity and the regressor of interest is the 
predicted values of VI from the first stage. The estimated effect of vertical integration on coded 
severity is given by the coefficient on VI_hat (0.122) divided by the sample mean of coded 
severity (1.17), or 10.43. 
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Appendix 3.11. Histogram of Instrumental Variable 
 
Note: IV – instrumental variable 
  
  
136 
 
 
Appendix 3.12. Patient Characteristics over the Distribution of the Instrumental Variable 
 
Variable 25th percentile of IV 50th percentile of IV 75th percentile of IV 
Age 71.9 72.5 72.2 
Female 58.9 59.2 58.3 
Poverty 16.1 12.1 14.7 
High School 86.4 88 85.3 
College 24.3 29.7 22.6 
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Appendix 3.13. Predicted HCC Score by Time and Treated Status of Preferred DD Specification 
 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Predicted margins 
Comparison at time -4 0.733*** 
 (0.727 - 0.739) 
Comparison at time -3 0.821*** 
 (0.816 - 0.826) 
Comparison at time -2 0.905*** 
 (0.901 - 0.909) 
Comparison at time -1 0.992*** 
 (0.989 - 0.995) 
Comparison at time 0 1.085*** 
 (1.082 - 1.087) 
Comparison at time 1 1.188*** 
 (1.185 - 1.191) 
Comparison at time 2 1.261*** 
 (1.257 - 1.266) 
Comparison at time 3 1.350*** 
 (1.344 - 1.356) 
Comparison at time 4 1.433*** 
 (1.425 - 1.440) 
Comparison at time 5 1.512*** 
 (1.503 - 1.521) 
Treated at time -4 0.712*** 
 (0.691 - 0.733) 
Treated at time -3 0.797*** 
 (0.776 - 0.818) 
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Treated at time -2 0.872*** 
 (0.832 - 0.912) 
Treated at time -1 0.992*** 
 (0.989 - 0.995) 
Treated at time 0 1.135*** 
 (1.114 - 1.157) 
Treated at time 1 1.512*** 
 (1.494 - 1.531) 
Treated at time 2 1.485*** 
 (1.467 - 1.504) 
Treated at time 3 1.548*** 
 (1.529 - 1.567) 
Treated at time 4 1.653*** 
 (1.634 - 1.673) 
Treated at time 5 1.754*** 
 (1.731 - 1.778) 
  
Observations 25,240,599 
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